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Article 5

Yoder: The Americanism of Justice Holmes

The Americanism of Justice Holmes
ANDRES YODER
There is no obvious way to reconcile each of Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr.’s intellectual sides. There is the monstrous Holmes, who
thought the world was meaningless, insignificant, and hopelessly violent.
There is the tender Holmes, who jealously guarded the time he could spend
enjoying literature, philosophy, and art. And there is the scholarly Holmes,
who left behind a litany of influential judicial opinions and articles, as well
as a classic book, The Common Law.
Although the gulfs between each of Holmes’s sides can make
reconstructing his thought seem daunting, the task is amenable to a fairly
simple solution: Holmes leavened his dismal worldview with a sense of self
that allowed him to think of life as valuable, and with a theory of
cooperative combinations that opened the door to a better future. Using
his famous dissent in Lochner v. New York as a case study, it becomes
possible to see how Holmes built his constitutional jurisprudence from
these basic premises.
Perhaps surprisingly, a close investigation of Holmes’s Lochner
dissent reveals that his worldview, his theory of combinations, and his
sense of self led him to reject the doctrine of judicial supremacy.
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“I believe in the iniquitous doctrine of my country right or wrong.
Don’t throw me over for my speculative wickedness.”
-Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.
in a letter to Alice Stopford Green1
INTRODUCTION
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. is an enigma. Even though his
outsized influence on American law is beyond dispute,2 his worldview and
self-understanding seem to come from anywhere but here. Toward the end
of his decades-long career on the bench, for example, he privately admitted
to British political theorist Harold Laski, “I see no right in my neighbor to
share my bread. . . . except so far as he in combination has power to take
it.”3 The reason? He had rejected “all postulates of human rights”4 in

1. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Alice S. Green (Nov. 9, 1913), in THE ESSENTIAL
HOLMES: SELECTIONS FROM THE LETTERS, SPEECHES, JUDICIAL OPINIONS, AND OTHER
WRITINGS OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. 22, 22 (Richard A. Posner ed., 1992)
[hereinafter THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES].
2. See, e.g., Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Legal Scholars, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 409,
424 tbl.6 (2000) (identifying Holmes as the third-most cited American legal scholar of all
time).
3. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Harold Laski (July 23, 1925), in THE ESSENTIAL
HOLMES, supra note 1, at 140, 141.
4. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Harold Laski (Oct. 23, 1926), in 2 HOLMES-LASKI
LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND HAROLD J. LASKI, 1916–1935,
at 887, 888 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1953) [hereinafter HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS VOL. 2].
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favor of power, coercive or otherwise.5 “Good and bad are of real
significance only for the future where our effort is one of the
instrumentalities that bring the inevitable to pass,”6 Holmes explained with
a shrug just before joining the Supreme Court.7 “If there is a world it
seems to me that one may surmise that our judgments of significance and
worth have no meaning for it.”8
Coming from a place where moral feelings and value judgments were
of little consequence, Holmes was content with more flitting breakthroughs
into “illusory [experiences of] personal spontaneity or independence . . . .”9
He saw that illusion in “less marked forms as consideration for the weak,
charity to the poor, drunkenness, going to the play, painting pictures, etc.”10
But the “ideal expression” of that illusion, he once unsettlingly told his old
friend Ellen Curtis, was suicide.11 If a priest sitting in a confessional had
overheard Holmes, he would hardly expect to be listening in on a towering
Supreme Court Justice. A lonely eccentric, maybe, or perhaps even a
madman. But how could a distinguished judge think that way? How did
Holmes keep his worldview and his self-understanding from poisoning his
pen?
Given Holmes’s unexpected prominence as a legal thinker, it is only
fitting that his dissenting opinion in Lochner v. New York12 is as enigmatic
as the man himself. Holmes’s dissent has become, without a doubt, holy
writ in American courts.13 One hundred twelve years on, judges continue
5. See, e.g., Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Frederick Pollock (Feb. 1, 1920), in THE
ESSENTIAL HOLMES, supra note 1, at 102, 102–03 (“I believe that force, mitigated so far as
may be by good manners, is the ultima ratio . . . .”).
6. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Alice S. Green (Oct. 1, 1901), in THE ESSENTIAL
HOLMES, supra note 1, at 111, 111.
7. Holmes was nominated to the Supreme Court on August 11, 1902 and confirmed on
December 4, 1902. See LIVA BAKER, THE JUSTICE FROM BEACON HILL: THE LIFE AND TIMES
OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 339–56 (1991). His tenure on the Court spanned thirty years.
See id. at 337–635.
8. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Alice S. Green (Oct. 1, 1901), in THE ESSENTIAL
HOLMES, supra note 1, at 111, 111.
9. Sheldon M. Novick, Justice Holmes’s Philosophy, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 703, 734
(1992) (quoting Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Ellen Curtis (Jan. 7, 1901), in Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr., Papers (on file with the Harvard Law School Library),
http://library.law.harvard.edu/suites/owh/index.php/item/36699695/8
[https://perma.cc/DQA3-Q73K].
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
13. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, “Wrong the Day it Was Decided”: Lochner and
Constitutional Historicism, 85 B.U. L. REV. 677, 692 (2005) (saying Holmes’s Lochner
dissent “became the canonical rejection of the anti-canonical decision in Lochner”).
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to rely on its prestige in even the biggest cases,14 and many of the
best-known scholars continue to sing its praises.15 So it comes as a surprise
when you thumb through the opinion and find that Holmes’s great dissent
is, according to law professor Cass Sunstein, positively soulless. In his
influential 1987 article Lochner’s Legacy,16 Sunstein describes Holmes’s
dissent as “com[ing] close to modern interest-group pluralism, which treats
the political process as an unprincipled struggle among self-interested
groups for scarce social resources”17—a description I will argue hits the
nail on the head.18 So aside from the obvious rhetorical merits of Holmes’s
opinion,19 it is not so easy to see how Holmes’s dissent has earned the
allegiance of generations.
In this Article, I tackle both the mystery of Holmes’s worldview and
self-understanding, and the riddle of his Lochner dissent. My working
theory is that each question helps answer the other. Holmes’s Lochner
opinion provides a concrete example of how he applies his personal views,
while his personal views give shape to his Lochner opinion. By setting the
questions side by side, it becomes possible to get a better handle on each.
Of course, seeing inside Holmes’s head is tricky. Despite leaving
behind mounds of judicial opinions, scholarly writings, speeches, and
letters to friends and admirers, his writing on the whole trends toward
partial thoughts, vignettes, and abbreviated commentary on others’ ideas.
And as the question presented by his Lochner dissent suggests, even
Holmes’s best legal writing only gets you so far. In order to get to the
essence of his thought, you have to consider his personal views. But that is
where the difficulty lies. Whether we look to Holmes’s weighty book The
Common Law or to any of his carefully crafted articles, he never went to
the trouble of fully explaining his worldview and sense of self. No matter
where you look, a complete accounting of Holmes is just not there. We
only have fragments.
14. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2612 (2015) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting) (quoting Holmes’s Lochner opinion favorably in a landmark same-sex marriage
case).
15. For example, in 2012, highly regarded judge and legal scholar Richard Posner
wrote: “Holmes’s one-page [Lochner] dissent says everything that needs to be said to
unmask any pretense that the majority was engaged in something that might be called legal
analysis.” Richard A. Posner, The Rise and Fall of Judicial Self-Restraint, 100 CAL. L. REV.
519, 549 (2012).
16. Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873 (1987).
17. Id. at 879.
18. See infra Section II.C (analyzing the mechanics of Holmes’s Lochner dissent).
19. See, e.g., ALLEN MENDENHALL, OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES JR., PRAGMATISM, AND
THE JURISPRUDENCE OF AGON: AESTHETIC DISSENT AND THE COMMON LAW 54–61 (2017)
(highlighting Holmes’s use of style and sound in his Lochner dissent).
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To complicate matters, the fragments we do have resist the big
picture. Holmes enjoyed making points with sketches rather than with
step-by-step arguments.20 He tended to glide over his ideas as if they were
familiar or well worn, even when they were not.21 And although he took
pains to maintain a plainspoken air, he often put things in a way that
suggested a deeper or personal meaning. To mark his ninetieth birthday,
for instance, CBS aired a radio broadcast of tributes to the venerable judge,
as well as his response.22 But rather than drawing a lesson from his career,
Holmes meditated on the poetry of Virgil.23 “Death plucks my ears and
says, Live—I am coming,” warned the Roman bard, to which the old
Yankee responded, “[T]o live is to function. That is all there is in living.”24
As hard as Holmes’s message might hit us, it is difficult to understand what
exactly he means. We can surely remember that life is functioning, but
how do we incorporate that wisdom into anything else?
In order to uncover Holmes’s fundamental commitments, I take his
advice on reading well. In a letter to British jurist Frederick Pollock,
Holmes explained how he thought the great German philosophers should
be read: “I believe that the real contribution of the [German]
system-makers was one that was shared in by outsiders—viz., a certain
number of aperçus or insights. The systems disappear, the insights
remain . . . .”25 So we see that in Holmes’s mind, even some of the most
technical and complex prose out there was best understood by zeroing in on
a few essential insights. When you apply Holmes’s interpretive technique
20. See, e.g., Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to John C. H. Wu (Aug. 26, 1926), in
JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: HIS BOOK NOTICES AND UNCOLLECTED LETTERS AND
PAPERS 186, 187 (Harry C. Shriver ed., 1936) [hereinafter BOOK NOTICES AND
UNCOLLECTED LETTERS] (“When the Germans in the late war disregarded what we called
the rules of the game, I don’t see there was anything to be said except: we don’t like it and
shall kill you if we can.”).
21. See, e.g., Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Frederick Pollock (Feb. 26, 1922), in 2
HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND SIR
FREDERICK POLLOCK 1874–1932, at 89, 90 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1942) (“I always say
that society is founded on the death of men—if you don’t kill the weakest one way you kill
them another—and the romance of life is largely found on the same fact . . . .”).
22. See G. EDWARD WHITE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: LAW AND THE INNER
SELF 462–66 (1993).
23. See id. at 463–64.
24. OLIVER W. HOLMES, Justice Holmes’ First and Only Radio Address, in BOOK
NOTICES AND UNCOLLECTED LETTERS, supra note 20, at 142, 142. See also Oliver W.
Holmes, Radio Address (1931), in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES, supra note 1, at 20, 21 (reciting
Holmes’s portion of the radio address).
25. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Frederick Pollock (Mar. 1, 1918), in 1
HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND SIR
FREDERICK POLLOCK, 1874–1932, at 260, 261 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1941).
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to his own catalog, you end up paying less attention to the particulars of
what he is saying, and more attention to how it makes sense for him to say
it. He becomes a rolling kaleidoscope of moods and observations—laid
over only a handful of repeating patterns.
In this Article, I outline those patterns in three parts. In Part I, I focus
on Holmes’s worldview and self-understanding. I outline the major
features of Holmes’s worldview, including his theory of cooperative
combinations, and I explain how his worldview gave shape and form to his
sense of self. Although I believe that Holmes’s worldview was explicitly
devoid of meaning, I maintain that his sense of self allowed him to see
individual life as meaningful, and that his theory of combinations suggested
that social life tends to improve over time.
In Part II, I look at the mechanics of Holmes’s Lochner dissent. I set
the stage by recounting the rise of a legal doctrine called the right to liberty
of contract. Then I identify what Holmes’s dissent responded to by
explaining how Justices Rufus Peckham and John Marshall Harlan
respectively applied that right in Lochner. I then turn my attention to
Holmes’s dissent. I explain how Holmes’s worldview informed his
rejection of the right to contract and led him to dismiss the doctrine of
judicial supremacy.
Finally, in Part III, I investigate how Holmes applied his
self-understanding to his Lochner dissent. I argue that while Holmes’s
worldview is sufficient to explain the approach he took to Lochner, he
augmented his reasons for taking that approach with the personal meaning
he took from his sense of self. Holmes, it turns out, was not willing to
leave a romantic view of life out of his jurisprudence. On the contrary, his
jurisprudence combined a gloomy worldview with an inspiring faith in the
American spirit.
In the end, I argue that Holmes’s Lochner dissent has a distinctly
sentimental side. It reflects Holmes’s sad and sweet sense of Americanism.
It salutes a hope that many Americans had locked away in their hearts.
And it shows us who Holmes really was. But before I can draw the man
out of the Lochner case, I must start at the beginning: Holmes’s worldview
and self-understanding.
I. HOLMES’S WORLDVIEW AND SELF-UNDERSTANDING
In order to explain Holmes’s basic outlook on life, I first have to
borrow a couple of terms from biology. When biologists ask why an
organism has certain features or traits, they take an ultimate perspective on
it, and when they ask how an organism does something, they take a
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proximate perspective.26 Biologist Edward Wilson recently illustrated the
distinction with an example.27 To understand why we have hands rather
than hooves or flippers, he explained, we must consider our evolutionary
history.28 But to understand how we actually use our hands, we have to
consider their anatomy and utility.29 So in rough terms, Wilson tells us that
the ultimate perspective seeks out objective explanations covering
evolutionary time, while the proximate perspective looks at how particular
organisms function in real time.30
In a 1900 address to the Tavern Club, Holmes announced that his
ultimate take on reality was positivistic: “Today the whole domain of truth
concerning the visible world,” he told the Club, “belongs to science.”31
Nineteen years later, in a letter to legal scholar Morris Cohen, he explained
that he had adopted his worldview when he was young. Describing his
general mindset as a “scientific way of looking at the world,”32 Holmes
gave Cohen his accounting of how he came to adopt it early in life. He
initially based it, he recalled, on what he knew of the ambitions of Charles
Darwin and the British philosopher Herbert Spencer, and what he thought
their ideas implied about human nature and humanity’s place in the
universe:

26. See, e.g., ERNST MAYR, THIS IS BIOLOGY: THE SCIENCE OF THE LIVING WORLD 67
(1997). German-American biologist Ernst Mayr notes that in 1938, British biologist “John
Baker was apparently the first author to distinguish clearly between ultimate . . . and
proximate ” biological explanations. ERNST MAYR, THE GROWTH OF BIOLOGICAL THOUGHT:
DIVERSITY, EVOLUTION, AND INHERITANCE 68 (1982).
27. See EDWARD O. WILSON, THE MEANING OF HUMAN EXISTENCE 15 (2014).
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. See id. In his 1899 speech entitled Law in Science and Science in Law, Holmes laid
out a general description of ultimate and proximate perspectives. Holmes explained that if
you take your perception of a particular statue or symphony, from the ultimate view the only
relevant observations you could make about them would be facts about their characteristics.
But from the proximate view, when you consider how your mind actually processes the
statue or symphony, it becomes relevant to observe how they make you feel. Holmes called
observations of ultimate reality quantitative determinations and observations of proximate
reality qualitative judgments. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Law in Science and Science in Law,
12 HARV. L. REV. 443, 456 (1899). Justice Holmes’s speech is also reprinted in OLIVER W.
HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 210 (1920) [hereinafter COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS], as
well as in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES, supra note 1, at 185.
31. Oliver W. Holmes, Remarks regarding Dr. S. Weir Mitchell, given at a Tavern Club
Dinner (Mar. 4, 1900), in THE OCCASIONAL SPEECHES OF JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES
119, 120 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1962) [hereinafter OCCASIONAL SPEECHES]. This
speech is also available in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES, supra note 1, at 48.
32. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Morris Cohen (Feb. 5, 1919), in THE ESSENTIAL
HOLMES, supra note 1, at 110, 110.
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My father was brought up scientifically . . . and I was not. Yet there was
with him . . . a certain softness of attitude toward the interstitial
miracle—the phenomenon without phenomenal antecedents, that I did not
feel. The difference [from the attitude of earlier times] was in the air,
although perhaps only the few of my time felt it. The Origin of Species I
think came out while I was in college. H. Spencer had announced his
intention to put the universe into our pockets—I hadn’t read either of them
to be sure, but as I say it was in the air. I did read [British historian Henry
Thomas] Buckle . . . [Ralph Waldo] Emerson and [British writer John]
Ruskin . . . . Probably a sceptical temperament that I got from my mother
had something to do with my way of thinking. . . . But I think science was
33
at the bottom.

Without much scientific training,34 the statements Holmes left behind
about his ultimate perspective are brief and vague. Luckily, he said enough
to give us a sense of what he thought the world was like. In talking about
his ultimate perspective, Holmes thought all living organisms (including
people) were purely physical and subject to the same natural laws as
everything else in nature.35 He liked to refer to organisms’ interactions as
the struggle for life—which describes the idea that the instinct to survive
creates conflicts between organisms that are often painful and deadly.36 In
Holmes’s cosmos, humans were like any other animal: one way or another,
they were constantly fighting for their share of the pie. However, rather
33. Id. Although Holmes did not read Darwin or Spencer when he was in college, he
read Darwin in his 60s, and Spencer soon after college. See MARK DEWOLFE HOWE,
JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: THE SHAPING YEARS 1841–1870, at 156 (1957).
34. Despite telling Cohen that he had not had a particularly science-based education,
soon after college Holmes was exposed to the philosophy of science from his friend and
mentor Chauncey Wright. See LOUIS MENAND, THE METAPHYSICAL CLUB: A STORY OF
IDEAS IN AMERICA 201–32 (2001). Wright seemed to have a lasting impact on Holmes. In
1929, at the age of 88, Holmes held onto the opinion that Wright had “real merit.” Letter
from Oliver W. Holmes to Frederick Pollock (Aug. 30, 1929), in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES,
supra note 1, at 108, 108.
35. See, e.g., Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Frederick Pollock (Aug. 30, 1929), in
THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES, supra note 1, at 108, 108 (“I see no reason for attributing to man a
significance different in kind from that which belongs to a baboon or to a grain of sand.”);
Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Harold Laski (Jan. 11, 1929), in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES,
supra note 1, at 107, 107–08 (“I regard [man] as I do other species (except that my private
interests are with his) having for his main business to live and propagate, and for his main
interest food and sex.”).
36. See, e.g., The Gas Stokers’ Strike, 7 AM. L. REV. 558, 583 (1873) [hereinafter The
Gas Stokers’ Strike] (“The struggle for life, undoubtedly, is constantly putting the interests
of men at variance with those of the lower animals. And the struggle does not stop in the
ascending scale with the monkeys, but is equally the law of human existence.”). Holmes’s
analysis of the Gas Stoker’s Strike is also reprinted in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES, supra note 1,
at 120.
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than being good or evil, the struggle for life is simply a fact about the
world. “The withering of a leaf, the sickness of man, the struggle for life,”
Holmes told Laski in 1926, “all are normal sequences of the datum—as are
frauds and murders.”37 “The world has produced the rattlesnake as well as
me,” he told diplomat Lewis Einstein a dozen years earlier, “but I kill it if I
get a chance, as also mosquitos, cockroaches, murderers, and flies. My
only judgment is that they are incongruous with the world I want . . . .”38
Holmes’s belief in a purely physical world did not stop at observable
phenomena. He applied it all the way down to human consciousness. “I
believe,” he told Taiwanese jurist John Wu in a 1926 letter,
that our personality is a cosmic ganglion, that just as when certain rays
meet and cross there is white light at the meeting point, but the rays go on
after the meeting as they did before, so, when certain other streams of
39
energy cross, the meeting point can frame a syllogism or wag its tail.

“I [don’t] see why anyone should bother,” he told Cohen a few years
earlier,
over the suggestion that consciousness is an epiphenomenon—It is the way
the cosmos acts when it gets a certain knot in its guts—and I don’t perceive
why there is any more right to think away consciousness than there is to
40
think away nerve tissue—the total is the datum.

But as cognitive scientist Steven Pinker observed in his 2002 book The
Blank Slate, if consciousness has a purely physical basis, we are left with a
staggering problem.41 Accepting that configurations of matter explain the
life of our minds—everything we experience and think and feel, including
our most sacred, profound, and strongly felt beliefs—what are we to make
of humanity’s meaning?42
Although Holmes plainly perceived this problem—“I doubt if a
shudder would go through the spheres if the whole ant heap were
kerosened,” he told Lewis Einstein in 190943—he never attempted to solve

37. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Harold Laski (Aug. 20, 1926), in THE ESSENTIAL
HOLMES, supra note 1, at 76, 77.
38. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Lewis Einstein (May 21, 1914), in THE ESSENTIAL
HOLMES, supra note 1, at 114, 114.
39. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to John C. H. Wu (May 5, 1926), in BOOK NOTICES
AND UNCOLLECTED LETTERS, supra note 20, at 184, 185.
40. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Morris Cohen (July 21, 1920), in Felix S. Cohen,
The Holmes-Cohen Correspondence, 9 J. HIST. IDEAS 3, 19 (1948).
41. See STEVEN PINKER, THE BLANK SLATE: THE MODERN DENIAL OF HUMAN NATURE
191–92 (2002).
42. See id.
43. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Lewis Einstein (Aug. 19, 1909), in THE ESSENTIAL
HOLMES, supra note 1, at xxv, xxvi.
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it. Instead, he moved beyond it. “I am not running the universe,” he wrote
in a 1912 letter to the Irish writer Canon Patrick Augustine Sheehan, “and
am not called on to lie awake with cosmic worries.”44 In a 1902 address at
Northwestern University, Holmes evoked the ultimate perspective and
expressed his feeling that it is incomplete: “[I]t might seem that the law of
life is . . . that man should produce food and raiment in order that he might
produce yet other food and other raiment to the end of time. Yet who does
not rebel at that conclusion?”45 Holmes’s solution was to supplement his
ultimate perspective with the proximate perspective (the existential
perspective of a mind functioning in real time). From that vantage point,
the only things that matter are specific pursuits.46
A few major themes run through Holmes’s discussion of the
proximate perspective, including two outward signs that a person is
operating from a proximate point of view. The first sign Holmes talked
about was the pursuit of something that is functionally useless.47 Holmes
44. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Patrick A. Sheehan (Oct. 18, 1912), in THE
ESSENTIAL HOLMES, supra note 1, at 7, 8; see also Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Lewis
Einstein’s Daughter (May 6, 1925), in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES, supra note 1, at 75, 75 (“I
think it futile to ask what does it all amount to. . . . [T]here is no answer except that it is not
our business to enquire.”).
45. Oliver W. Holmes, Address of Chief Justice Holmes at the dedication of the
Northwestern University Law School Building (Oct. 20, 1902), in COLLECTED LEGAL
PAPERS, supra note 30, at 272, 272. This speech is also reprinted in THE ESSENTIAL
HOLMES, supra note 1, at 98.
46. See, e.g., Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Patrick A. Sheehan (Apr. 1, 1911), in
HOLMES-SHEEHAN CORRESPONDENCE: THE LETTERS OF JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES
AND CANON PATRICK AUGUSTINE SHEEHAN 40, 41 (David H. Burton ed., 1976) [hereinafter
HOLMES-SHEEHAN
CORRESPONDENCE]
(“I
look
at
man
as
a
cosmic
[insignificance], . . . except from a human and social point of view, working to some
unknown end or no end, outside himself and having sufficient reasons, easily stated, for
doing his best.”). Holmes’s use of the proximate perspective is among the least understood
aspects of his thought. Law professor Brian Leiter has dismissed it as “silly mysticism and
romantic wistfulness.” Brian Leiter, Holmes, Nietzsche, and Classical Realism, 37 (Univ. of
Tex. Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper No. 003, 2000),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=215193
[https://perma.cc/Y34BR3ZK]. Law professor Albert Alschuler has criticized it as a type of nihilism that attempts
to find meaning through blind commitment. See ALBERT W. ALSCHULER, LAW WITHOUT
VALUES: THE LIFE, WORK, AND LEGACY OF JUSTICE HOLMES 20–23 (2000). But I think
Leiter and Alschuler are both wrong. As explained below, Holmes’s proximate perspective
is both consistent with positivism and capable of adequately addressing the question of life’s
meaning. Infra text accompanying notes 47–63.
47. See, e.g., Oliver W. Holmes, Remarks regarding Rudolph C. Lehmann, given at a
Tavern Club Dinner (Nov. 24, 1896), in OCCASIONAL SPEECHES, supra note 31, at 90, 91
(“[U]selessness is the highest kind of use. It is kindling and feeding the ideal spark without
which life is not worth living.”). In his 1902 speech Address of Chief Justice Holmes,
Holmes distinguished between humanity’s ultimate concerns and useless proximate pursuits,
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keyed in on uselessness because when a person pursues a goal that has no
practical benefit, it suggests the person pursues it as an end in itself. The
pursuit is the reward.48 Holmes vividly illustrated this sign in his 1896
speech, Rudolph C. Lehmann:
[One summer] I went down to see a man go through the [Niagara Falls]
rapids on a boat of his construction. I got there a little late and the man was
drowned before I arrived. Afterwards a lady talking of the accident said
that if the attempt had promised any possible good to his fellow men the
case would have been different, but that under the circumstances she could
not see any justification for a pure waste of life. I replied, Madam, on the
contrary precisely because it was not useful it was a perfect expression of
this male contribution to our common stock of morality. . . . [Without this
49
uselessness] life is not worth living.

Holmes’s second outward sign that a person is operating from the
proximate perspective is the pursuit of something that is unattainable.50
Like useless goals, unattainable goals do not pay, so when a person pursues
them their motivation must be the experience of the chase. In explaining
this idea to Laski, Holmes identified absolute truth and moral perfection as
examples of such goals.51 And like the pursuit of useless things, Holmes
and called that distinction the “double view of life.” Address of Chief Justice Holmes at the
dedication of the Northwestern University Law School Building (Oct. 20, 1902), in
COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS, supra note 30, at 272, 272–75.
48. See Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Harold Laski (May 24, 1919), in 1
HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND HAROLD J.
LASKI, 1916–1935, at 207, 208 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1953) [hereinafter HOLMES-LASKI
LETTERS VOL. 1] (“I desire a world in which art and philosophy, in their useless aspect, may
have a place. I say useless, to mark the point that they are ends in themselves.”); Oliver W.
Holmes, Address of Chief Justice Holmes, at the dedication of the Northwestern University
Law School Building (Oct. 20, 1902), in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS, supra note 30, at 272,
272–73 (“Art, philosophy, charity, the search for the north pole, the delirium of every great
moment in man’s experience—all . . . mean waste . . . . The justification of art is not that it
offers prizes to those who succeed in the economic struggle . . . . The justification is in art
itself . . . .”).
49. Oliver W. Holmes, Remarks regarding Rudolph C. Lehmann, given at a Tavern
Club Dinner (Nov. 24, 1896), in OCCASIONAL SPEECHES, supra note 31, at 90, 90–91.
50. See, e.g., Oliver W. Holmes, The Soldier’s Faith, Address to the graduating class of
Harvard University (May 30, 1895), in OCCASIONAL SPEECHES, supra note 31, at 73, 76
(“[W]ho of us could endure a world . . . without the senseless passion for knowledge
out–reaching the flaming bounds of the possible, without ideals the essence of which is that
they never can be achieved?”). This speech is also reprinted in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES,
supra note 1, at 87.
51. See Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Harold Laski (Apr. 6, 1920), in THE
ESSENTIAL HOLMES, supra note 1, at 115, 115 (“[Truth] postulates itself as a thing to be
attained, but like other good ideals it is unattainable and therefore may be called absurd.
Some ideals, like morality, a system of specific conduct for every situation, would be
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thought the pursuit of unattainable things made life meaningful. As he told
the Federal Bar Association in 1932: “Life seems to me like a Japanese
picture which our imagination does not allow to end with the margin. We
aim at the infinite and when our arrow falls to earth it is in flames.”52
As heady as useless and unattainable pursuits can be, it turns out that
Holmes’s understanding of the proximate perspective encompasses much
more. In going about their daily lives, people normally take a proximate
view. When they do, they pursue things that are both useful and
attainable.53 Speaking from his own experience as a judge, Holmes said
that when he considered a case, it did not trigger any abstract moral or
philosophical feelings like egotism, selflessness, or a sense of duty.54 He
was merely fixated on the problem he was trying to solve, and he did his
best to solve it.55 In an 1897 speech called George Otis Shattuck, Holmes
listed other examples of everyday efforts that take a proximate focus,
including navigating the seas, contributing to a war effort, arguing a case in
court, or running a company.56 “If you want to hit a bird on the wing,”
Holmes told the Suffolk Bar a few years later, “you must have all your will
in a focus . . . you must be living in your eye on that bird. Every
achievement is a bird on the wing.”57
Holmes thought day-to-day proximate thinking takes up the bulk of
thinking people do.58 After acknowledging that some people seem to live
detestable if attained and therefore . . . must be . . . striven for on the tacit understanding that
it will not be reached . . .”).
52. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to the Federal Bar Association (Feb. 29, 1932), in
BOOK NOTICES AND UNCOLLECTED LETTERS, supra note 20, at 143, 143. This letter is also
available in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES, supra note 1, at 20.
53. See, e.g., Oliver W. Holmes, Remarks at a dinner given in Holmes’s honor by the
Bar Association of Boston (Mar. 7, 1900), in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS, supra note 30, at
244, 247 (“The joy of life is to put out one’s power in some natural and useful or harmless
way. There is no other.”). This speech is also reprinted in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES, supra
note 1, at 77, 79.
54. See Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Patrick A. Sheehan (Mar. 21, 1908), in
HOLMES-SHEEHAN CORRESPONDENCE, supra note 46, at 21, 22.
55. Id. (“[A] sense of responsibility is a confession of weakness. If I put all my powers
into deciding the case . . . I neither feel responsibility nor egotism, nor yet altruism—I am
just all in the problem and doing my best.”).
56. See Oliver W. Holmes, George Otis Shattuck, in OCCASIONAL SPEECHES, supra note
31, at 92, 95–96. This speech is also available in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES, supra note 1, at
97.
57. Oliver W. Holmes, Remarks at a dinner given in Holmes’s honor by the Bar
Association of Boston (Mar. 7, 1900), in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS, supra note 30, at 244,
247. This speech is also reprinted in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES, supra note 1, at 77.
58. See, e.g., Oliver W. Holmes, Remarks regarding Albert Venn Dicey, given at a
Tavern Club Dinner (Nov. 4, 1898), in OCCASIONAL SPEECHES, supra note 31, at 106, 107
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their lives with a predominant focus on useless or unattainable goals, he
believed they were anomalies, telling Einstein on one occasion, “[W]hile I
often feel like a worm when I read of men whose dominant motive is love
for their kind, I console myself by thinking that most of the great work
done in the world comes from a different type.”59 In a 1925 letter to Wu,
Holmes offered his own defense of the idea that most people simply focus
on performing their daily work. “I [do not] believe the economic
opinion . . . intimated [in the New Testament],”60 Holmes remembered
telling an acquaintance. “[T]o love my neighbor as myself [does] not seem
to me the true or at least the necessary foundation for a noble life,” he
continued.61
I [think] the true view [is] that of my imaginary society of jobbists . . . .
Their job is their contribution to the general welfare and when a man is on
that, he will do it better the less he thinks either of himself or of his
neighbors, and the more he puts all his energy into the problem he has to
62
solve.

“[A] man who thinks he has been an egotist all his life,” he told Laski a few
years earlier, “will find on the Day of Judgment that he has been a better
altruist than those who thought more about it.”63
Although anyone’s attention can glide from the ultimate world to a
“jobbist” proximate pursuit, exactly what the proximate view can offer is
still hemmed in by the limitations imposed by nature. Even if everyone
had a job, not everyone would benefit equally from any particular person’s
work. People are still subject to the laws Darwin set down, and the
struggle for life will always reward some more than it rewards others.64
(“The interest of men is not money or beauty or truth but the pursuit of money or beauty or
truth. And all experience the same vital pleasure—the one great pleasure and end of
life—that of realizing their own spontaneous energy through whatever channel they are able
to bring it out.”).
59. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Lewis Einstein (Jan. 15, 1915), in THE
HOLMES-EINSTEIN LETTERS: CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND LEWIS EINSTEIN
1903–1935, at 105, 106 (James Bishop Peabody ed., 1964).
60. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to John C. H. Wu (Mar. 26, 1925), in BOOK NOTICES
AND UNCOLLECTED LETTERS, supra note 20, at 178, 178.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Harold Laski (Dec. 9, 1921), in THE ESSENTIAL
HOLMES, supra note 1, at 115, 115.
64. See The Gas Stokers’ Strike, supra note 36, at 583 (“It has always seemed to us a
singular anomaly that believers in the theory of evolution and in the natural development of
institutions by successive adaptations to the environment, should be found laying down a
theory of government intended to establish its limits once for all by a logical deduction from
axioms. . . . This tacit assumption of the solidarity of the interests of society is very
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But for Holmes, life’s built-in necessity to compete was not only
destructive, it was also the basis for pools of social stability and increased
productivity.65 In his 1885 address The Law, Holmes briefly surveyed
human history from 30,000 feet and saw a series of “painful step[s]” and
“world-shaking contest[s] by which mankind has worked and fought its
way from savage isolation to organic social life.”66 On Holmes’s
accounting of the past, the instinct to survive drew people together into
cooperative combinations so that they could more easily satisfy their needs
and wants, and so that they would be better able to compete against other
groups, people, and animals.67 Even in a Darwinian world, Holmes
believed, social life tends to expand the circle of people who benefit from a
particular person’s efforts.68
Although Holmes’s theory as to how societies evolve contains a streak
of optimism, he did not consider it to be starry-eyed. He thought the theory
merely described the way things were. As he explained in his dissent in the
1896 Massachusetts case Vegelahn v. Guntner: “It is plain from the
slightest consideration of practical affairs, or the most superficial reading of
industrial history, that free competition means combination, and that the
organization of the world, now going on so fast, means an ever-increasing
might and scope of combination.”69 And Holmes was right. During his
adulthood, the United States’ industrial and agricultural production grew

common, but seems to us to be false.”). This article is also reprinted in THE ESSENTIAL
HOLMES, supra note 1, at 120.
65. See MENDENHALL, supra note 19, at 101 (arguing that Holmes viewed society as
being “rife with conflict that necessitates eusociality, a behavioral condition in which
members of a civilization learn to work together to secure healthier, safer lives for
themselves and their posterity regardless of their divergent principles and fundamental
disagreements”).
66. Oliver W. Holmes, The Law, Remarks at a Suffolk Bar Association Dinner (Feb. 5,
1885), in OCCASIONAL SPEECHES, supra note 31, at 20, 22. This speech also appears in THE
ESSENTIAL HOLMES, supra note 1, at 221.
67. See Holmes, The Gas Stokers’ Strike, supra note 36, at 583 (“The struggle for life,
undoubtedly, is constantly putting the interests of men at variance with those of the lower
animals. And the struggle does not stop in the ascending scale with the monkeys, but is
equally the law of human existence.”); OLIVER W. HOLMES, Law and the Social Factor, in
BOOK NOTICES AND UNCOLLECTED LETTERS, supra note 20, at 138, 138 (arguing that in the
course of history, society has been determined by “the mechanically determined outcome of
the cooperation and clash of private effort.”).
68. See, e.g., Oliver W. Holmes, Remarks to the Essex Bar (undated), in OCCASIONAL
SPEECHES, supra note 31, at 48, 49 (“Our country . . . is bound to the other nations more and
more closely by wire and rail and steamer, by commerce, yes, and by sympathy, as the
world grows more and more one.”).
69. Vegelahn v. Guntner, 44 N.E. 1077, 1081 (Mass. 1896) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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fourfold.70 At the same time, huge disparities in wealth opened up between
business elites and everyone else.71 According to political scientist Howard
Gillman, the pull of workers into expanding industries and the uneven
accumulations of wealth “resulted in intensified battles between wage
earners seeking a greater share of the wealth being produced and owners
seeking lower labor costs.”72
So it is no wonder that one of Holmes’s most developed examples of
combinations centered on the battles between organized labor and business
leaders. As a judge, those battles often found him. When Holmes
considered disputes between labor and capital, his starting point was
always capitalism. He championed capitalism because he thought it was
the best way yet devised to harness people’s natural tendencies to look after
their own interests and to do so in combination with others.73 In order to
stay on top, business leaders have to outperform their rivals by accounting
for what the public wants, what it is likely to want in the future, and how
much it is willing to pay.74 That means increasing accumulations of capital
are signs that society is becoming more productive and more responsive to
popular needs and wants.75 Holmes sometimes illustrated this idea with a
quip about investor Albert Nickerson. “He made a fortune in the stock
market—and said one day—‘They talk of our leading the market. We only
follow the procession ahead, like little boys. If we turn down a side street
the procession doesn’t.’ Which I thought showed size.”76
70. See HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF
LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 76 (1993).
71. Id. at 77.
72. Id.
73. See, e.g., Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Harold Laski (July 16, 1926), in
HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS VOL. 2, supra note 4, at 856, 856 (“[T]he capitalist regime [is]
better than the proposed substitutes . . . .”).
74. See OLIVER W. HOLMES, Economic Elements, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS, supra
note 30, at 279, 280–81 (“[T]he ability of the ablest men under the present regime is
directed to getting the largest markets and the largest returns. . . . [I]f every desirable object
were in the hands of a monopolist, intent on getting all he could for it . . . they would be
consumed by those who were able to get them and that would be the ideal result.”) This
work also appears in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES, supra note 1, at 128.
75. See Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Franklin Ford (Apr. 6, 1911), in THE
ESSENTIAL HOLMES, supra note 1, at 138, 138 (“[As for] the problem [of] . . . adjusting
production to the equilibrium of social desires . . . if every desideratum were in the hands of
a separate monopolist bent on getting all he could for it, you would get an ideal result, if
each monopolist knew his business, as he would have to keep his place. I confess that the
present passion for disorganization seems to me, I won’t say amazing, but certainly
foolish.”).
76. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Harold Laski (Apr. 22, 1922), in HOLMES-LASKI
LETTERS VOL. 1, supra note 48, at 417, 418. Holmes used this quip sixteen years earlier in a
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Holmes was perhaps never more clear about how well he thought
capitalism captured mankind’s natural tendency to combine with others
than in his 1913 address to the Harvard Law School Association. “We are
apt to contrast the palace with the hovel, the dinner at Sherry’s with the
working pail,” he began,
[but] large ownership means investment, and investment means the
direction of labor towards the production of the greatest returns . . . . [W]e
need to think things instead of words—to drop ownership, money, etc., and
to think of the stream of products; of wheat and cloth and railway travel.
When we do, it is obvious that the many . . . have substantially all there
is . . . [and] that the function of private ownership is to divine in advance
77
the equilibrium of social desires.”

Thirteen years earlier, in his dissent in the Massachusetts case Plant v.
Woods,78 Holmes similarly argued that capitalism’s merits emerge when it
is considered in light of the cold logic of anthropological fact:
The annual product, subject to an infinitesimal deduction for the luxuries of
the few, is directed to consumption by the multitude, and is consumed by
the multitude always. . . . It is only by devesting [sic] our minds of
questions of ownership and other machinery of distribution, and by looking
solely at the question of consumption,—asking ourselves what is the annual
product, who consumes it, and what changes would or could we
79
make,—that we can keep in the world of realities.

Although Holmes thought capitalists could distribute goods and
services more efficiently and effectively than anyone else, he was unwilling
to put roadblocks up in front of other groups who had interests that were
adverse to theirs.80 It was always counterproductive, he thought, to
interfere with the nonviolent activities of any combination.81 In the 1904

letter to Pollock. See Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Frederick Pollock (May 25, 1906),
in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES, supra note 1, at 67, 68.
77. Oliver W. Holmes, Law and the Court, Speech at a Dinner of the Harvard Law
School Association of New York (Feb. 15, 1913), in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS, supra note
30, at 291, 293–94. This speech is also reprinted in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES, supra note 1,
at 145.
78. Plant v. Woods, 57 N.E. 1011 (Mass. 1900).
79. Id. at 1016 (Holmes, C.J., dissenting).
80. See, e.g., id. (“But, subject to the qualifications which I have expressed, I think it
lawful for a body of workmen to try by combination to get more than they are now getting,
although they do it at the expense of their fellows, and to that end to strengthen their union
by the boycott and the strike.”).
81. See, e.g., Vegelahn v. Guntner, 44 N.E. 1077, 1081 (Mass. 1896) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) (“The only debatable ground is the nature of the means by which . . . damage [in
pursuit of a larger market share] may be inflicted. We all agree that it cannot be done by
force or threats of force.”).

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol39/iss2/5

16

Yoder: The Americanism of Justice Holmes

2017]

THE AMERICANISM OF JUSTICE HOLMES

369

Supreme Court case Northern Securities Co. v. United States,82 Holmes
argued that the ancient law of the struggle for life described social instincts
better than free market principles did.83 In response to Harlan’s plurality
opinion, in which he maintained that the Constitution’s Commerce Clause84
empowers Congress to prohibit certain kinds of anticompetitive
combinations,85 Holmes wrote:
I am happy to know that only a minority of my brethren adopt an
interpretation of the law which in my opinion would make eternal the
[Hobbesian war of all against all] and disintegrate society so far as it could
into individual atoms. If that were its intent I should regard calling such a
law a regulation of commerce as a mere pretense. It would be an attempt to
86
reconstruct society.

Eight years earlier in Vegelahn, Holmes similarly connected the struggle
for life with combinations and opposed them both to the law of
competition.87 Business owners, he explained, have always been able to
harm their competitors “in the battle of trade”88 because it is
“generally . . . accepted that free competition is worth more to society than
it costs.”89 “I have seen the suggestion made,” he continued,
that the conflict between employers and employees is not competition. But
I venture to assume that none of my brethren would rely on that suggestion.
If the policy on which our law is founded is too narrowly expressed in the
term “free competition,” we may substitute “free struggle for life.”
Certainly, the policy is not limited to struggles between persons of the same
class, competing for the same end. It applies to all conflicts of temporal
90
interests.

So under the heading of the struggle for life, Holmes was able to study
the activity of capitalists and the activity of organized labor using a single
set of assumptions. Everyone, he was convinced, combines to get more of
what they want. The contests “between the effort of every man to get the
82. N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
83. See id.
84. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
85. The law in question was the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., which
prohibits every contract, combination, monopoly, or attempted monopoly in restraint of
interstate trade or commerce. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–3 (2012). Harlan only narrowed the sweeping
language of the Act by interpreting it as enacting “the general law of competition.” N. Sec.
Co., 193 U.S. at 338 (Harlan, J., plurality opinion) (quoting United States v. Joint Traffic
Ass’n, 171 U.S. 505, 569 (1898)).
86. N. Sec. Co., 193 U.S. at 411 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
87. Vegelahn v. Guntner, 44 N.E. 1077, 1077 (Mass. 1896) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 1081.
89. Id. at 1080.
90. Id. at 1080–81.
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most he can for his services, and that of society, disguised under the name
of capital, to get his services for the least possible return,” Holmes wrote in
Vegelahn, was only “[o]ne of the eternal conflicts out of which life is made
up.”91 No government, he added, could change that reality. “Combination
on the one side is patent and powerful. Combination on the other is the
necessary and desirable counterpart, if the battle is to be carried on in a fair
and equal way.”92 “It seems to me futile,” he concluded, “to set our faces
against [the] tendency [to combine]. Whether beneficial on the whole, as I
think it, or detrimental, it is inevitable, unless the fundamental axioms of
society, and even the fundamental conditions of life, are to be changed.”93
II. THE MECHANICS OF HOLMES’S LOCHNER DISSENT
In Part I, I explained that Holmes broke the world up into a positivistic
ultimate view and an existential proximate view, and used a theory of
combinations to understand social life, including disputes between business
owners and organized workers. In this Part, I use Holmes’s dissenting
opinion in Lochner to illustrate how his jurisprudence was shaped by his
acceptance of positivism and by his commitment to his theory of
combinations. To do that, I first contextualize Holmes’s dissent by
examining the rise of liberty of contract, a legal doctrine Holmes’s
colleagues thought was critical to the Lochner case. Then I walk through
the mechanics of Lochner’s majority opinion and main dissent, which
his dissent responds to.
My overall argument will be that the
ultimate-proximate divide and the law of combinations provide the
foundation on which Holmes built his Lochner opinion.
A. Liberty of Contract
The right to liberty of contract is a now-defunct constitutional
doctrine94 that says the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

91. Id. at 1081.
92. Id. In this passage, Holmes specifically made the case that allowing employees to
combine was a matter of fairness. In doing so, he was in the mainstream of his day. Two
years before Vegelahn, the presidentially appointed United States Strike Commission issued
a report on the Pullman Strike in which it made the same argument: “[S]o long as railroads
are . . . permitted to combine to fix wages and for their joint protection, it would be rank
injustice to deny the right of all labor upon railroads to unite for similar purposes.” U.S.
STRIKE COMM’N, REPORT ON THE CHICAGO STRIKE OF JUNE-JULY, 1894, at xxxi (1895).
93. Vegelahn, 44 N.E. at 1081 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
94. See W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391–400 (1937) (overruling
Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923), a case in which the Court applied the
right to liberty of contract); JAMES R. STONER, JR., COMMON-LAW LIBERTY: RETHINKING
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protects “the right to purchase or to sell labor”95 from unreasonable
regulations.96 However, because the Due Process Clause never mentions
liberty of contract, understanding how that right came to be requires some
explanation. As law professor David Bernstein noted in his 2003 article
Lochner Era Revisionism, Revised, the right to contract arose from a brew
of American constitutional theory, natural law, and Anglo-American
historicism.97
“When leading postbellum lawyers considered American
constitutionalism,” Bernstein explained,
they thought of it not as being solely the powers and prohibitions contained
within the four corners of a document. Rather, they took a cue from British
constitutional theorists, who posited that England had a “constitution”
despite the absence of any such written document. American theorists
argued that the United States, too, had an unwritten constitution, one that
complemented and supplemented the written document. . . .
In England, the constitution only restrained the monarchy and was
safeguarded by Parliament, leading to a system of legislative supremacy.
In the United States, [however], the federal government was a government
of limited and enumerated powers, restrained by a written Constitution and,
98
many thought, natural rights, enforceable by the judiciary.

Reconstruction and Gilded Age judges also enforced the unwritten
constitution against the states. Before the country adopted the Fourteenth
Amendment in 1868, “states were thought to be sovereign and could only
be restrained by express constitutional provisions.”99 However, not long
after the Amendment was adopted, judges began to see it as initiating a
new era in the federal government’s relationship with state governments.100
Specifically, postbellum judges believed the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause—which prohibits states from “depriv[ing] any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law”101—required a new

AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 144 (2003) (“After [the 1937 case] West Coast
Hotel, . . . liberty of contract is never used again by the Supreme Court to strike a
statute . . . .”).
95. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905) (Peckham, J.).
96. See id. (Peckham, J.) (“Both property and liberty are held on such reasonable
conditions as may be imposed by the governing power of the State . . . and with such
conditions the Fourteenth Amendment was not designed to interfere.”).
97. See David E. Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism, Revised: Lochner and the
Origins of Fundamental Rights Constitutionalism, 92 GEO. L.J. 1 (2003).
98. Id. at 31–32 (footnote omitted).
99. Id. at 32.
100. See id. at 31–35.
101. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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understanding of American federalism.102 “[They] argued that the Clause
gave courts the right and obligation to enforce against the states not just the
largely procedural rights protected by the Magna Carta and long-standing
Anglo-American traditions, but all fundamental individual rights deemed
essential to the development of American liberty . . . .”103 So whereas
before the Fourteenth Amendment became law, the state legislatures and
state courts were the “ultimate guardians of the people’s liberty at the state
and local levels,”104 after the Amendment was adopted, the federal courts
became the final defenders of liberty. The Due Process Clause, judges
thought, required them to directly enforce unwritten constitutional
guarantees of liberty against the states.105
When judges enforced the unwritten constitution against the states,
they saw themselves as protecting fundamental natural rights that “antedate
positive law and that can be discovered through human reason.”106 By
1905, when the Court decided Lochner,
a virtual consensus seems to have developed among the [Supreme Court]
Justices that due process principles protected fundamental [natural] rights
that were antecedent to government. . . . The main dispute in the Court was
not over the existence of fundamental judicially-enforceable unenumerated
rights, nor was the dispute primarily about the content of those
rights. . . . Rather, . . . the Justices disagreed about how vigorously
107
fundamental rights should be enforced against the states . . . .

Despite the wide agreement on the revolution sparked by the Due
Process Clause, the judges who wanted to follow through with the new
federalism still faced a practical problem. There is no “set formula” for
defining an unwritten natural right with enough specificity to resolve a
particular dispute.108 However, aside from Holmes,109 every Justice on the

102. See Bernstein, supra note 97, at 34.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 32.
105. See id. at 32.
106. Id. at 35.
107. Id. at 37–38.
108. Id. at 38.
109. In his Lochner dissent, Holmes mentioned the “fundamental principles as they have
been understood by the traditions of our people and our law.” Lochner v. New York, 198
U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Bernstein characterizes that comment as
Holmes’s “grudging[] acknowledge[ment]” that courts were required to apply fundamental
natural rights against the states. Bernstein, supra note 97, at 38. However, as I explain infra
Section II.C, with that comment Holmes was merely adding broad criteria to a
reasonableness test.
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Lochner Court found a way to overcome that problem through a process
Bernstein describes as “an implicit legal historicism.”110
Judges of the Lochner period believed they could identify particular
fundamental natural rights “through historical studies” rather than
“rationalistic introspection.”111 “One scholar,” Bernstein noted, “described
the historicism of the Lochner era as the conceiving of law ‘as an evolving
product of the mutual interaction of race, culture, reason, and events.’”112
“Historicists of the time,” Bernstein went on to explain, “believed that
‘societies, social norms, and institutions are the outgrowth of continuous
change effected by secular causes’ but that they ‘evolve according to moral
ordering principles that are discoverable through historical studies.’”113 So
Lochner-era judges did not think of natural rights theory as a purely
abstract system of limits on state power and constitutional guarantees.
Instead, they thought of the theory “‘as confirmation of rights they thought
were embedded’ in the Anglo-American tradition.”114
Aided by the new federalism set off by the Fourteenth Amendment
and working from a base of natural rights and historicism, the 1890s Fuller
Court developed the idea that the Due Process Clause recognizes a right to
contract. As the Gilded Age gave way to the Progressive Era, “labor unrest
and Populist agitation . . . fueled fears” among many of the country’s
conservatives, business owners, and governing elite “of imminent
Socialism . . . .”115 In that climate, many jurists began to view “[t]he right
to pursue an occupation free from unreasonable government interference”
as a vital means of protecting “private enterprise.”116 In the words of
Henry Weismann, one of the attorneys who challenged the law at issue in

110. See Bernstein, supra note 97, at 39.
111. Id. (quoting Stephen A. Siegel, Historism in Late Nineteenth-Century
Constitutional Thought, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 1431, 1435 (1990)).
112. Id. (quoting Siegel, supra note 111, at 1435).
113. Id. (quoting Siegel, supra note 111, at 1438).
114. Id. at 38 (quoting Stephen A. Siegel, Lochner Era Jurisprudence and the American
Constitutional Tradition, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1, 83 (1991)).
115. Id. at 41; see also Victoria F. Nourse, A Tale of Two Lochners: The Untold History
of Substantive Due Process and the Idea of Fundamental Rights, 97 CAL. L. REV. 751, 792
(2009) (“The great issue in the Lochner era was labor and its association with socialism.”).
116. Bernstein, supra note 97, at 41–42; see generally David E. Bernstein, Lochner v.
New York: A Centennial Retrospective, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1469, 1500–05 (2005)
[hereinafter Centennial Retrospective] (discussing the press’s reaction to the Court’s
Lochner decision); Nourse, supra note 115, at 778–79 (also noting the reception of the
Lochner decision by the national press).
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Lochner,117 when the Court first struck down a labor law on
liberty-of-contract grounds, they fired “a warning [shot] to the Radicals and
Socialists . . . and [gave] inspiration to those who still believe in the
old-time doctrines of Americanism.”118
Within the span of a few years, the Fuller Court would both introduce
liberty of contract and defend it as a right protected by the Due Process
Clause. The effort began with Justice Henry Brown’s opinion for the Court
in the 1894 case Lawton v. Steele.119 In Lawton, as part of a discussion on
the extent of states’ inherent powers, Brown tossed in the idea that state
legislatures “may not . . . arbitrarily interfere with private business, or
impose unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations.”120
The following year in Frisbie v. United States,121 Justice David Brewer
sharpened Brown’s pronouncement by “conced[ing] that . . . among the
inalienable rights” guaranteed by the Constitution “is that of the liberty of
contract.”122 But it was not until the 1897 case Allgeyer v. Louisiana123 that
the Court finally took full advantage of the new federalism, natural rights
theory, and historicism, to make a full-throated argument that the Due
Process Clause guarantees a right to contract.
Writing for the Allgeyer Court, Justice Rufus Peckham’s holding was
relatively narrow: “[A] citizen of a state, under the [Due Process Clause,
has] a right to contract outside of the state for insurance on his property.”124
But in “broad dicta,”125 he signaled to the nation that the Court was ready to
invalidate laws under the Due Process Clause for violating the right to
contract. “The liberty mentioned in [the Due Process Clause,]” Peckham
wrote,
is deemed to embrace the right of the citizen . . . to live and work where he
will, to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling, to pursue any livelihood
or avocation, and for that purpose to enter into all contracts which may be

117. See PAUL KENS, LOCHNER V. NEW YORK: ECONOMIC REGULATION ON TRIAL 111–28
(1998). Although in Lochner Weismann opposed the ten-hour provision, he was also
instrumental in getting the law passed. See id. at 52–60.
118. Centennial Retrospective, supra note 116, at 1501–02 (quoting Henry Weissman,
Celebration of Victory (1905), in BAKERS REV., June 1905, at 41, 41).
119. Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1894).
120. Id. at 137 (Brown, J.).
121. Frisbie v. United States, 157 U.S. 160 (1895).
122. Id. at 165 (Brewer, J.).
123. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1896).
124. Id. at 590–91 (Peckham, J.).
125. See Bernstein, supra note 97, at 44.
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proper, necessary, and essential to his carrying out to a successful
126
conclusion the purposes above mentioned.

Peckham then defended the new interpretation of the Due Process Clause
with appeals to natural law and historicism. Peckham first characterized
liberty of contract as an “inalienable right”127 and said that it had been
given to “all men . . . by their Creator.”128 After that, he defended the right
to contract as fundamental to Anglo-American freedom, calling it a “large
ingredient in the civil liberty of the citizen,”129 “one of the privileges of a
citizen of the United States,”130 and “a material part of the liberty of the
citizen.”131 The Due Process Clause, according to Peckham, required
courts to enforce the fundamental and natural right to liberty of contract
against the states. In his estimation, protecting American liberty meant
complementing and supplementing the Due Process Clause with that right.
Although when the Court decided Allgeyer in 1897 it had yet to rely
on the new doctrine, Peckham’s strong endorsement of it made it ready to
use in future cases. And as it happened, Lochner—which came tumbling
down the pike in 1905—was one of those cases.
B. Peckham’s Majority Lochner Opinion and Harlan’s Dissent
As in Allgeyer, Peckham wrote the majority opinion in the 1905
Lochner case.132 There, he considered a challenge to a provision in New
York’s Bakeshop Act that limited bakers to working ten hours per day and
sixty hours per week.133 For Peckham, the relevant legal framework began
with New York’s general power to pass legislation—a power that exists “in
the sovereignty of each State . . . somewhat vaguely termed police
powers.”134 Whereas in the early days of the Republic, states could pass
laws limiting individuals’ liberty without federal supervision,135 after the
126. Allgeyer, 165 U.S. at 589.
127. Id. (quoting Butchers’ Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111 U.S. 746, 762 (1884)
(Bradley, J., concurring)).
128. Id. (quoting Butchers’ Union, 111 U.S. at 762).
129. Id. at 590 (quoting Butchers’ Union, 111 U.S. at 762).
130. Id. (quoting Butchers’ Union, 111 U.S. at 764).
131. Id. (quoting Butchers’ Union, 111 U.S. at 765).
132. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
133. See id. at 46 n.1 (1905) (reproducing the language of the ten-hour provision).
134. Id. at 53 (Peckham, J.) (emphasis added).
135. See id. at 73 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (describing the “inherent power of the States”
as “embrac[ing] everything within the territory of the State not surrendered to the [Federal]
Government” (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 203 (1824))); see also id. at 56 (“It
must, of course, be conceded that there is a limit to the valid exercise of the police power by
the State. . . . Otherwise the Fourteenth Amendment would have no efficacy.”).
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adoption of the Due Process Clause judges would review police-power
laws to determine whether they invaded individuals’ fundamental natural
rights.136 Noting that the courts had not yet exactly described137 how
fundamental rights fit together with states’ police powers, Peckham
checked off a few purposes for enacting police-power laws that were by
then well established: “safety, health, morals, and general welfare of the
public.”138
After setting up a framework that used fundamental rights to limit the
reach of states’ police powers, Peckham laid out his test for determining
whether a particular law was “within the police power of [a] State”139 or
whether it ventured into territory protected by a fundamental right.140 A
law is a “valid” police-power measure, Peckham explained in a critical
passage, if it has a “direct relation, as a means to an end, and the end itself
must be appropriate and legitimate.”141
Peckham envisioned a clean distinction between a law that was a valid
police-power measure, and a law that infringed a fundamental natural right.
In the event a judge was presented with a Due Process challenge to a
“border” law142—that is, a law that infringes a fundamental right for the
ostensible purpose of achieving a recognized police-power
objective—Peckham believed that an investigation of the underlying facts
would show whether the law was valid.143 If, as a matter of fact, the law
genuinely furthers a police-power objective, then it had to be upheld as a
law “the Fourteenth Amendment was not designed to interfere [with].”144
The Due Process Clause, Peckham believed, allows for “legitimate”
exceptions.145
When Peckham turned to the ten-hour law, it was obvious to him that
by restricting the terms over which master bakers and bakers could bargain,
the provision had “necessarily interfere[d] with the [fundamental natural]

136. See id. at 57 (saying that the question of whether a police-power measure steps on a
right guaranteed by the Due Process Clause “must be answered by the court”).
137. Id. at 53.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 57.
140. See id. at 58 (“We think the limit of the police power has been reached and passed
in this case.”).
141. Id. at 57–58.
142. Id. at 54.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 53.
145. Id.
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right of contract” mentioned in Allgeyer.146 As a result, the law could only
be upheld as valid if a factual inquiry revealed that an established exception
applied. After brushing off the ideas that the ten-hour law could be “valid
as a labor law” or valid as a measure to protect the public’s health,147
Peckham announced that “[t]he law must be upheld, if at all, as a law
pertaining to the health of the individual engaged in the occupation of a
baker.”148
Peckham’s first order of business was to clarify that a law to protect
workers’ health must apply to jobs that rise to an unusual level of
unhealthfulness.149 Although he never defined where that level was, he was
willing to say that “[t]here must be more than . . . the possible existence of
some small amount of unhealthiness.”150 Having thus sketched his
approach to the ten-hour provision, Peckham’s analysis was simple.
Apparently relying on statistics contained in the appendix to the plaintiff’s
brief,151 Peckham rejected the idea that the baking trade rose to a level of
unhealthfulness that would warrant interference with the right to contract:
In looking through statistics regarding all trades and occupations, it may be
true that the trade of baker does not appear to be as healthy as some other
trades, and is also vastly more healthy than still others. To the common
understanding the trade of baker has never been regarded as an unhealthy
152
one.

Because the baking trade was not an unusually unhealthy one, Peckham
concluded, “the limit of the police power has been reached and passed in

146. Id. Before coming to that conclusion, Peckham was careful to point out that the
maximum-hours law was not intended to make up for bakers’ inability to freely exercise
their wills. “[T]he statute was [not] intended to meet a case of involuntary labor,” Peckham
wrote. Id. at 52. Furthermore, “There is no contention that bakers as a class are not equal in
intelligence and capacity to men in other trades or manual occupations . . . . They are in no
sense wards of the State.” Id. at 57.
147. Id. at 57.
148. Id.
149. See id. at 59. (“[T]he trade of baker . . . is . . . vastly more healthy than [other
trades]. To the common understanding, the trade of a baker has never been regarded as an
unhealthy one.”).
150. Id.
151. See David E. Bernstein, The Story of Lochner v. New York: Impediment to the
Growth of the Regulatory State, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 325, 344 (Michael C.
Dorf ed., 2004).
152. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 59. Peckham followed up his apparent reference to the
appendix by saying, “To the common understanding, the trade of a baker has never been
regarded as an unhealthy one.” Id. But by that point, Peckham had already mentioned a
judge on the New York Court of Appeals who specifically thought otherwise. Id. at 58. So,
the appendix provides better support for Peckham’s argument.
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this case.”153 “The act is not, within any fair meaning of the term, a health
law, but is an illegal interference with the [right to contract], both [of]
employers and employe[e]s . . . .”154
Much like Peckham’s thinking started out with states’ police powers,
so did Harlan’s in his main Lochner dissent. “[W]hat is called the police
power of the State,” Harlan wrote in the opening line of his opinion, “has
been uniformly recognized . . . by the . . . courts.”155 Harlan also agreed
with Peckham that there were areas that police powers could not go. The
Due Process Clause protects certain natural rights, Harlan argued,156
“which cannot be violated even under the sanction of direct legislative
enactment.”157 Harlan even echoed Peckham’s observation that the border
between states’ police powers and fundamental rights had yet to be fully
mapped out. The “boundaries of what is called the police power of the
State,” Harlan explained as he opened his dissent, “extends at least to the
protection of the lives, the health and the safety of the public.”158
But unlike Peckham, Harlan would not independently review facts to
determine whether a police-power measure was valid. Rather than using
Peckham’s means-end test, Harlan put his own test forward. “[T]he rule is
universal,” Harlan said with the support of a handful of authorities, “that a
legislative enactment . . . is never to be disregarded or held invalid unless it
be, beyond question, plainly and palpably in excess of legislative
power.”159 He tied his deferential test to his own understanding of the new
federal system created by the Fourteenth Amendment. Deference to state
legislatures, Harlan maintained, “necessarily results from the principle that
the health and safety of the people of a State are primarily for the State to

153. Id. at 58.
154. Id. at 61.
155. Id. at 65 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
156. See id. at 73–74 (saying that “[t]he preservation of the [inherent] powers of the
States is quite as vital as the preservation of the [federal government’s] power[]” to “void
[state laws] under the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
157. Id. at 68. In this passage Harlan actually said there is a right to contract that cannot
be violated by direct regulation. He did not mention fundamental natural rights in general.
However, at the beginning of his opinion, he said the right to contract was just one of the
“inherent rights belonging to everyone.” Id. at 65. Consequently, it is clear that, like
Peckham, Harlan thought fundamental natural rights in general limited the reach of states’
police powers.
158. Id. at 65. Later in his opinion, Harlan said the right to contract can “be subjected to
regulations designed . . . to promote the general welfare or to guard the public health, the
public morals or the public safety.” Id. at 67. Then towards the end of his opinion, Harlan
echoed his original formulation, saying that states have the “inherent power . . . to care for
the lives, health and well-being of their citizens.” Id. at 73.
159. Id. at 68.
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guard and protect.”160
To subject the states to more demanding
supervision, he reasoned, would “enlarg[e] the scope of the Amendment far
beyond its original purpose.”161
After establishing his framework, Harlan turned his attention to the
maximum-hours law. Like Peckham, Harlan relied on Allgeyer for the idea
that the right to contract put a limit on how far a state’s police power could
go.162 Unlike Peckham, however, he did not introduce the ten-hour
provision as “necessarily interfer[ing] with the right of contract.”163
Instead, Harlan began his opinion by presuming that the provision was a
valid police-power measure to protect bakers’ health.164 “If there be doubt
as to the validity of the statute, that doubt must therefore be resolved in
favor of its validity . . . . [T]he burden of [proving the statute is plainly and
palpably unconstitutional] . . . is upon those who assert it to be
unconstitutional.”165 And that was a burden, Harlan argued, that could not
be met.
Harlan made a straightforward case that the ten-hour law could not
have plainly and palpably extended beyond New York’s police power. He
first appealed to common experience. “[We] all know[] the air constantly
breathed by workmen is not as pure and healthful as that to be found in
some other establishments . . . .”166 Then he supported his appeal to
general knowledge with a few authorities. Harlan quoted studies and
statistics that characterized the profession of baking as “highly injurious
to . . . health[;]”167 that described bakers as being “of more delicate health
than [other] workers[;]”168 and that asserted shorter hours of work
“improved health.”169 Laymen’s experience, coupled with the support of a
number of authorities, was all Harlan needed to be confident that the law
160. Id. at 73.
161. Id.
162. See id. at 65–66 (“[T]he State, in the exercise of its powers, may not unduly
interfere with right of the citizen to enter into contracts . . . . This was declared in
Allgeyer . . . .”); see also id. at 68 (“[T]here is a liberty of contract which cannot be violated
even under the sanction of direct legislative enactment . . . .”).
163. Id. at 53.
164. See id. at 69 (“[T]he statute must be taken as expressing the belief of the people of
New York that . . . labor in excess of sixty hours during a week in [bakeshops] may
endanger the health of those who thus labor.”).
165. Id. at 68 (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 421 (1819)).
166. Id. at 70.
167. Id. (quoting a translated passage likely from LUDWIG HIRT, DIE KRANKHEITEN DER
ARBEITER: BEITRÄGE FÖRDERUNG DER ÖFFENTLICHEN GESUNDHEITSPFLEGE (1871)).
168. Id. (quoting an unidentified source).
169. Id. at 71 (quoting STATE OF N.Y., EIGHTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BUREAU OF
LABOR STATISTICS 82 (1901)).
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did not plainly and palpably go beyond New York’s police power.170 As a
result, he could not help but conclude that the “[C]ourt will transcend its
functions if it assumes to annul the statute of New York.”171
C. Holmes’s Lochner Dissent
While appeals to natural rights were critical in Peckham’s and
Harlan’s respective resolutions of the Lochner case, Holmes was unable to
follow along in their adventure. His positivism would not allow it. In his
1918 article Natural Law, Holmes broke down the belief in natural law into
what he took to be its true origin: a readiness to draw unscientific
conclusions from everyday experience and anthropological facts.172 “The
jurists who believe in natural law seem to me to be in that naïve state of
mind that accepts what has been familiar and accepted by all men
everywhere,”173 Holmes observed as he pursued natural-rights thinking to
its root:
Reason working on experience does tell us, no doubt, that if [we wish to
live in society], we can do it only on [certain] terms. . . . If I do live with
others they tell me that I must do and abstain from doing various things or
they will put the screws on to me. I believe that they will, and being of the
same mind as to their conduct I not only accept the rules but come in time
to accept them with sympathy and emotional affirmation and begin to talk
174
about duties and rights.

Rather than relying on natural law, Holmes used a theory of the
judicial role to address specific conflicts that arose under vague
constitutional provisions. Holmes borrowed the architecture of his theory
from James Bradley Thayer—a law professor who had been a partner at the
firm where he began his legal career.175 In his influential 1893 article The
Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law,176

170. Harlan acknowledged that the question as to whether the ten-hour law protects
bakers’ health is one which “there is room for debate and for an honest difference of
opinion.” Id. at 72.
171. Id. at 70.
172. OLIVER W. HOLMES, Natural Law, in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES, supra note 1, at 180,
181. Holmes’s article is also reprinted in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS, supra note 30, at 310.
173. Natural Law, in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES, supra note 1, at 180, 181.
174. Id. at 181–82. A couple of years earlier, in a letter to Laski, Holmes was blunter in
his estimation of natural law, stating “[a]ll my life I have sneered at the natural rights of
man.” Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Harold Laski (Sept. 15, 1916), in THE ESSENTIAL
HOLMES, supra note 1, at xxiv, xxv.
175. See WHITE, supra note 22, at 95, 197.
176. James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional
Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893).
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Thayer rejected the doctrine of judicial supremacy—the idea that judges
have the “authority to set [their] opinions about the correct meaning of the
Constitution above those of Congress, the president, [and] the
electorate.”177 Instead, as legal scholar Larry Kramer has explained,
Thayer’s article taught that the “primary authority to interpret the
Constitution is outside the courts and that judicial authority to declare
statutes unconstitutional is, at most, a subordinate, secondary check.”178
Despite how it may sound to modern ears, Thayer’s rejection of
judicial supremacy was not new or even necessarily radical. It was instead
a view of the American judiciary that had deep roots and historical support
at the highest levels of government. Most of Thayer’s article, in fact, is an
ordered collection of old statements about the judicial role, including views
that had been aired out by Constitutional Convention delegates179 and by
Supreme Court Justices.180 Although Thayer did not take the time to
contextualize the numerous remarks he highlighted in his article, Kramer
was happy to do the job for him. In his 2012 paper Judicial Supremacy
and the End of Judicial Restraint,181 Kramer explained that the sources
Thayer relied on were part of a single and well-established school of
constitutional thought he calls popular constitutionalism.182 That school,
Kramer wrote, had been “embraced and advocated” by none other than the
Democratic-Republican Party, the party of Thomas Jefferson.183
Popular constitutionalism stands for the idea that the “primary
authority to interpret . . . constitutional law rest[s] actively in the
community . . . .”184
And Jeffersonians, the original popular

177. KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: THE
PRESIDENCY, THE SUPREME COURT, AND CONSTITUTIONAL LEADERSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY 7
(2007).
178. Larry D. Kramer, Judicial Supremacy and the End of Judicial Restraint, 100 CALIF.
L. REV. 621, 628 (2012); see Thayer, supra note 176, at 148 (“[T]he judicial question [of
what the legislature may do] is a secondary one. The legislature in determining what shall
be done . . . does not divide its duty with the judges, nor must it conform to their conception
of what is prudent or reasonable legislation.”).
179. See, e.g., Thayer, supra note 176, at 140–41 (quoting Constitutional Convention
delegate James Wilson as saying that “laws might be dangerous and destructive, and yet not
so ‘unconstitutional as to justify the judges in refusing to give them effect.’”).
180. See, e.g., id. at 141 (quoting Justice William Patterson as arguing that “in order to
justify the court in declaring any law void, there must be ‘a clear and unequivocal breach of
the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative implication.’”).
181. See Kramer, supra note 178.
182. See Kramer, supra note 178, at 622.
183. Id.
184. Id. (italics omitted). For a more detailed discussion of what Kramer means by
popular constitutionalism, see Larry D. Kramer, “The Interest of the Man”: James Madison,
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constitutionalists, would have thought the community had two means of
asserting its prerogative. In the first instance, the community directly
checked the constitutionality of legislation. If a legislature passed a law
that most people rejected as unconstitutional, the community could push
back on it “through protests, petitions, elections, and other forms of direct
popular action.”185 It was only as a secondary check that judicial review
came into the picture.186 Under the Jeffersonian theory, a judge acted as an
“agent[] of the people.”187 A judge’s proper role was merely to rule in
accordance with the community’s understanding of what the Constitution
meant.
A Jeffersonian judge would only strike a law down as
unconstitutional under “conditions of near certainty—because the
[community] was capable of acting on its own and retained primary
responsibility for doing so at all times.”188
In writing his article, however, Thayer had a purpose beyond merely
digging up a bygone understanding of the judicial role. “[H]is particular
point was to . . . . restore the older, historically preeminent [Jeffersonian]
idea of judicial authority—including its notions of self-restraint and
deference—and to reject the Gilded Age Court’s pretensions to [judicial]
supremacy.”189 But in an effort to close the sale on an old theory, Thayer
updated it to make it more palatable for his time. “[T]he idea of direct
popular supervision—assumed and widely accepted in the Early
Republic—no longer made sense [in Thayer’s day].”190 So in advocating
for popular constitutionalism, Thayer “[i]nstead . . . assumed that the
political branches of government, and especially the legislature, offer the
best expression of popular views.”191 But even if Thayer thought it best to
whittle the Jeffersonian theory’s first check on legislatures down to regular
elections and ordinary lobbying efforts, he preserved the larger point in
full: judges should defer to legislatures’ opinions as to what the
Constitution means.
Mere days after Thayer published his article, Holmes wrote to
congratulate him and express his agreement with his argument. “I have
read your article,” Holmes told Thayer, “and . . . . [s]ubstantially I agree
Popular Constitutionalism, and the Theory of Deliberative Democracy, 41 VAL. U. L. REV.
697 (2007).
185. Kramer, supra note 178, at 625.
186. A “minority” of Jeffersonian popular constitutionalists, however, thought “judicial
review in any form was improper.” Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 625–26.
189. Id. at 628.
190. Id.
191. Id.
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with it heartily . . . .”192 Although Holmes suggested that Thayer may have
read too much into old statements that spoke approvingly of judicial
deference—statements that Thayer acknowledged could have been “mere
courteous and smoothly transmitted platitude[s]”193—he had “no doubt” of
the “usefulness of insisting upon” popular constitutionalism at a time when
judicial supremacy had been advanced by “some of the other judges.”194
Like Thayer, Holmes did not think judges should be in the business of
applying elaborate constitutional theories to the particular cases they had to
resolve.
He instead thought judges should be ready to validate
constitutional rationales that were broadly held, even if they did not agree
with them.
When Holmes wrote to Thayer, he did not go so far as to say that
Thayer’s article convinced him to accept any new major views. “[Y]our
article . . . makes explicit,” Holmes wrote, “the point of view from which
implicitly I have approached Constitutional questions . . . .”195
Nevertheless, Holmes was proud to say that he had borrowed a key element
of Thayer’s article for his own use. When Thayer compiled passages that
demonstrated historical support for popular constitutionalism, he organized
them so as to line up with two related propositions. After seeing what
those propositions were, Holmes revealed that he would adopt them for his
own use, telling Thayer, “I believe in your formula.”196
Thayer’s first proposition identified a judge’s proper role. When a
judge considers the constitutionality of a statute, he should
“merely . . . fix[] the outside border” of acceptable constitutional
rationales.197
Well before Holmes read Thayer’s article, he believed that legislatures
were worthy of respect because the most powerful groups in a community

192. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to James B. Thayer (Nov. 2, 1893), in David Luban,
Justice Holmes and the Metaphysics of Judicial Restraint, 44 DUKE L.J. 449, 462 n.34
(1994).
193. Thayer, supra note 176, at 145.
194. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to James B. Thayer (Nov. 2, 1893), in Luban, supra
note 192, at 462 n.34. Compare LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 215 (2004) (saying that between Reconstruction
and the New Deal, neither popular constitutionalism nor judicial supremacy had clearly
gained the upper hand), with Keith E. Whittington, Give “The People” What They Want?,
81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 911, 918–20 (2006) (arguing that between Abraham Lincoln’s and
Franklin Roosevelt’s respective presidencies, judicial supremacy was the dominant view).
195. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to James B. Thayer (Nov. 2, 1893), in Luban, supra
note 192, at 462 n.34.
196. Id.
197. Thayer, supra note 176, at 148.
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used them to demonstrate their power.198 In his 1873 article The Gas
Stokers’ Strike,199 for example, Holmes argued that people join all sorts of
combinations to get more of what they want. Political combinations, he
was careful to point out, are no different. In a short passage outlining his
theory of legislative power, Holmes pushed the idea that because people
instinctively look out for their own interests, nothing will ever stop them
from passing laws that benefit themselves at a cost to others:
The struggle for life, undoubtedly, is constantly putting the interests of men
at variance with those of the lower animals. And the struggle does not stop
in the ascending scale with the monkeys, but is equally the law of human
existence. . . . [T]his is as true in legislation as in any other form of
corporate action. . . . [W]hatever body may possess the supreme power for
the moment is certain to have interests inconsistent with others which have
200
competed unsuccessfully.

Because political combinations are simply outer manifestations of
deep evolutionary drives, it would be “idle” to try to stop them.201 “As
long as . . . [human] instinct[s] remain[],” Holmes maintained several years
later in The Common Law, “it will be more comfortable for the law to
satisfy [them] in an orderly manner . . . . If it should do otherwise, it would
become a matter for pedagogues, wholly devoid of reality.”202 The lesson
Holmes took from his scientific worldview was that power will always find
a way to exert itself. To deny that is to deny how people have always
behaved. So in The Gas Stokers’ Strike, when Holmes concluded his
discussion on what legislation is, he argued that the actual forces behind
particular laws had to be respected: “The more powerful interests must be
more or less reflected in legislation; which, like every other device of man
or beast, must tend in the long run to aid the survival of the fittest.”203

198. See, e.g., OLIVER W. HOLMES, Cooley and Constitutional Limitations, in BOOK
NOTICES AND UNCOLLECTED LETTERS, supra note 20, at 97, 98–99 (“Where the sovereign
power resides at any time, and what is the sovereign will, are questions of fact. But the old
constitution is an admitted expression of the sovereign will, and that assures us that no other
is authentic which does not come through certain channels. The courts may properly abide
by that until they see that the new manifestation is not only unmistakable, but irresistible.”).
199. The Gas Stokers’ Strike, supra note 36, at 582.
200. Id. at 107–08.
201. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Harold Laski (Sept. 15, 1916), in THE ESSENTIAL
HOLMES, supra note 1, at xxiv, xxv (“Law also as well as sovereignty is a fact. If in fact
Catholics or atheists are proscribed and the screws put on, it seems to me idle to say that it
[ought not be] because [it goes against] a theory that you and I happen to hold . . . .”).
202. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 213 (1881) [hereinafter THE
COMMON LAW].
203. The Gas Stokers’ Strike, supra note 36, at 583.
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Thayer’s second proposition was a reasonableness test. Statutes
falling outside the border of acceptable constitutional rationales are those
where legislators “have not merely made a mistake, but have made a very
clear one,—so clear that it is not open to rational question.”204
Thayer’s reasonableness test ensured that a judge remained deferential
on constitutional questions. If a judge should be ready to validate statutes
backed by a variety of constitutional rationales, then he should only strike
down laws that embody constitutional theories that no reasonable person
could hold. Following Thayer’s lead, Holmes would later use the
reasonableness test for the same purpose.205 But Holmes also had practical
considerations in mind. In a 1912 letter to Sheehan, tucked away in a
passage in which he described how his understanding of his role as a judge
required a healthy dose of self-restraint, Holmes defended his habit of
looking only at the modest question of reasonableness:
One of the queer aspects of duty is when one is called on to sustain or
enforce laws that one believes to be economically wrong and do more harm
than good—but as I think we know very little as to what the laws
pronounced good; as there is no even inarticulate agreement as to the ideal
to be striven for, and no adequate scientific evidence that this rather than
that will tend to bring it about if we did agree as to what we want, I settle
down on simple tests. I look at it like going to the theatre—if you can pay
206
for your ticket and are sure you want to go, I have nothing to say.

So for Holmes, Thayer’s reasonableness test not only assured that a
legislature’s primary authority to interpret the Constitution would be left
intact, it also humbly acknowledged that there were critical questions of
political prudence and fact that courts had no way of resolving. As far as

204. Thayer, supra note 176, at 144.
205. According to law professor David Luban, “Holmes adhered to Thayer’s
[reasonableness test] . . . in several substantive due process dissents,” including his dissents
in Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404 (1923); Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923);
and Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915). Luban, supra note 192, at 462 & n.33. As I
explain infra text accompanying notes 214–32, Holmes used Thayer’s reasonableness test in
Lochner, as well.
206. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Patrick A. Sheehan (Nov. 23, 1912), in THE
ESSENTIAL HOLMES, supra note 1, at 27, 28; see also Oliver W. Holmes, Twenty Years in
Retrospect, Remarks to a banquet of the Middlesex Bar Association (Dec. 3, 1902), in
OCCASIONAL SPEECHES, supra note 31, at 154, 156 (“It has seemed to me that . . . we have
few scientific data on which to affirm that one rule rather than another has the sanction of
the universe, [and] that we rarely could be sure that one tends more distinctly than its
opposite to the survival and welfare of the society where it is practiced . . . .”). Holmes’s
Twenty Years in Retrospect speech is also reprinted in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES, supra note
1, at 151.
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Holmes was concerned, judges did not have special access to wisdom and
knowledge everyone else lacked.
Holmes’s Lochner opinion does not give us what we have come to
expect from a Supreme Court dissent. As Judge Richard Posner has
observed, Holmes’s Lochner dissent “does not join issue sharply with the
majority, is not scrupulous in its treatment of the majority opinion or of
precedent, [and] is not thoroughly researched.”207 Noting similar defects,
law professor Akhil Reed Amar has complained that Holmes’s dissent is
actually not “helpful in explaining exactly what [interests] the Fourteenth
Amendment [protects].”208 What Posner’s and Amar’s criticisms fail to
account for, however, is Holmes’s Thayerianism.209 Holmes had no reason
to argue the Fourteenth Amendment compelled a particular outcome in the
Lochner case. He instead thought his job was merely to decide whether the
constitutional rationale behind the ten-hour law was reasonable. It was a
simple process requiring only broad strokes. Once Holmes’s Lochner
dissent is considered in that light, the analytical merits of his argument
become easier to see.210
In staking out a framework to analyze the maximum-hours provision,
Holmes relied exclusively on Thayer’s first proposition (that a judge should
be deferential to widely held constitutional theories). Holmes was so
convinced of its correctness that, in an opinion that is only a touch over 600
words, he repeated it three times. “I strongly believe,” Holmes wrote in the
207. RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION 285
(1988).
208. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND
PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY 560 n.23 (2012).
209. Later, in a 2012 paper called The Rise and Fall of Judicial Self-Restraint, Posner
notes Thayer’s influence on Holmes. See Posner, supra note 15, at 525–28, 543. In his
analysis, however, Posner characterizes Holmes’s Lochner dissent as “invo[king] . . . a
handful of cases” to demonstrate the reasonableness of the ten-hour provision. Id. at 543.
However, as I argue infra text accompanying notes 214–32, Holmes actually identified two
constitutional rationales that could justify the maximum-hours law, and argued for the
reasonableness of those rationales by appealing to past cases and to three types of laws.
210. Law professor Barry Friedman has noticed the influence of Thayer’s article on
Holmes’s Lochner dissent. According to Friedman, Holmes “recognized the existence of
‘liberty to contract’” but thought it conflicted with the New York legislature’s “right” to
enact the ten-hour law. Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty,
Part Three: The Lesson of Lochner, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1383, 1430 (2001) (quoting Lochner
v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting)). Friedman argues that
Holmes “resolved” the conflict in part by using Thayer’s reasonableness test. Id. at
1430–31. However, as I argue in this Section, Holmes rejected both the right to contract
and the natural law framework on which it was based, and instead relied on the vision of the
judicial role Thayer laid out in his article. Holmes’s Lochner dissent amounted to a
straightforward argument that the legislature should have its way.
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opening lines of his dissent, in “the right of a majority to embody their
opinions in law.”211 Then at the halfway mark, Holmes circled back to
where he began: “[A constitution] is made for people of fundamentally
differing views, and the accident of our finding certain opinions natural and
familiar or novel and even shocking ought not to conclude our judgment
[as to] whether statutes embodying them [are unconstitutional].”212 As he
wound down his opinion, Holmes again directed his readers’ attention to
Thayer’s first proposition: “I think that the word liberty in the Fourteenth
Amendment is perverted when it is held to prevent the natural outcome of a
dominant opinion.”213
Having emphasized the idea that judges should do what they could to
validate legislative majorities’ preferred constitutional theories, Holmes
spent most of his energy on Thayer’s second proposition—the
reasonableness test. In Lochner and elsewhere, Holmes added teeth to
Thayer’s reasonableness test by describing what qualities a reasonable
constitutional rationale should have.214 Whereas Thayer would invalidate a
law only when it was clear no rational person could think it was
constitutional, in Lochner Holmes looked to see whether the constitutional
theory behind it would “infringe fundamental principles as they have been
understood by the traditions of our people and our law.”215 He would only
grant the reasonableness label to the maximum-hours provision if it was
sufficiently consistent with his understanding of actual Anglo-American
practices.
Holmes identified two distinct constitutional rationales for the
maximum-hours provision and he defended them both as being consistent
with American culture. The first ten-hour-law justification Holmes
identified was one that appealed directly to a police-power objective all of
his colleagues recognized as legitimate. “A reasonable man,” Holmes
wrote in Lochner, “might think [the ten-hour provision] a proper [police
power] measure on the score of health.”216 In order to demonstrate his
point, Holmes cited two newly decided cases in which the Supreme Court

211. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
212. Id. at 76.
213. Id.
214. See, e.g., Tyson & Bro. v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 446 (1927) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) (equating reasonableness with having the support of “a sufficient force of public
opinion”); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 280 (1918) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(equating reasonableness with the moral consensus of “civilized countries”); Otis v. Parker,
187 U.S. 606, 609 (1903) (Holmes, J.) (equating reasonableness with “relatively
fundamental rules of right, as generally understood by all English-speaking communities”).
215. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
216. Id.
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validated state measures that limited the terms people could bargain over
out of concern for the health of some part of the population. First he cited
Jacobson v. Massachusetts,217 where the Court upheld a Massachusetts
measure requiring vaccinations against smallpox because it was a
reasonable regulation to protect Massachusettsans’ health and safety.218
Then he cited Holden v. Hardy,219 where the Court upheld a Utah law that
limited the number of hours miners and smelters could work because
Utahns reasonably thought that the law was necessary to protect their
health.220 Both of these cases showed that Americans had accepted the idea
that state governments could restrict the right to contract when enough
people decided a health concern was more important. The ten-hour law,
Holmes thought, was well within that tradition.221
The second constitutional rationale for the ten-hour law that Holmes
defended as meeting the reasonable test was “paternalism,”222 an ideology
he referred to in private as socialism223 and “qualified” versions of it,
including turn-of-the-century Progressivism.224 Holmes was willing to
view a paternalistic law as being consistent with the liberty guaranteed by
the Due Process Clause because he did not equate freedom with any
particular method of protecting free will. Freedom was instead no different
than any other moral feeling. It was an interested, often self-serving
“generalization[] of the conditions of social welfare expressed in terms of
emotion.”225
Depending on their circumstances, two people living in the same
community at the same time could have conflicting views of what it means

217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
See id. at 25–30 (Harlan, J.).
Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898).
See id. at 398 (Brown, J.).
See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Id.
Compare Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Lewis Einstein (Nov. 24, 1912), in THE
ESSENTIAL HOLMES, supra note 1, at 66, 66 (describing public schools and post offices as
“socialist”), with Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75 (listing “school laws” and “the Post Office” as
institutions consistent with paternalism).
224. See Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Lewis Einstein (Nov. 24, 1912), in THE
ESSENTIAL HOLMES, supra note 1, at 66, 66 (calling support for the policies favored by
Progressive Party candidate Theodore Roosevelt a “yearning for Socialism, qualified or
not”). The ten-hour law at issue in Lochner was passed as a result of the efforts of
unionized bakers and Progressive reformers. See, e.g., KENS, supra note 117, at 49–63.
225. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Felix Frankfurter (Apr. 8, 1913), in HOLMES AND
FRANKFURTER: THEIR CORRESPONDENCE, 1912–1934, at 8, 8 (Robert M. Mennel & Christine
L. Compston eds., 1996) [hereinafter HOLMES & FRANKFURTER].
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to secure freedom. A laissez-faire advocate,226 for example, could think
that prohibiting employers from paying employees to work over a set
number of hours unfairly limits employers’ freedom to pursue profits.227
Meanwhile, a paternalist could think that as a practical matter, systematic
imbalances in bargaining power unfairly deprive employees of the freedom
to contract for sensible caps on their work hours.228 So as Holmes
understood it, the idea of freedom is influenced by political opinions as to
which groups should have more, and which should have less. As applied to
the maximum-hours law at issue in Lochner, a paternalist would think that
freedom meant tipping the scales in favor of bakers. The law was a way to
secure bakers’ practical liberty.
In his dissent, Holmes argued that the paternalistic take on bakers’
hours met Thayer’s reasonableness test because Anglo-American culture
has a long history of chipping away at the freedom to contract in order to
secure redistributive objectives. A reasonable man, Holmes wrote, could
“uphold [the ten-hour law] as a first instalment of a general regulation of
the hours of work.”229 The reasonableness of benefitting bakers by
narrowing the terms their counterparts could insist on was proven by
similar measures that state and federal governments had already put into
place without complaint, including “Sunday laws,” “usury laws,” and “the
prohibition of lotteries.”230 Holmes also cited Otis v. Parker,231 a case in
which the Court validated a California constitutional provision that
prohibited speculation in stocks because Californians reasonably believed it
was a dangerous practice.232 Each of these initiatives, Holmes maintained,
put limitations on the right to contract so that one group or another could
obtain benefits they would not otherwise get. The maximum-hours law
was no different.
Although Holmes spent most of his Lochner opinion on his Thayerian
argument for the constitutionality of the maximum-hours provision, he

226. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (framing Lochner as a
disagreement between paternalists and laissez-faire advocates).
227. See also Oliver W. Holmes, Draft of opinion of the Court, Keokee Consol. Coke Co.
v. Taylor, 234 U.S. 224 (1914), quoted in G. Edward White, Revisiting Substantive Due
Process and Holmes’s Lochner Dissent, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 87, 110–11 (1997) (“It now is
recognized by . . . everyone . . . that as a fact freedom may disappear . . . through the power
of aggregated . . . men . . . .”) (emphasis added).
228. See also id. (“It now is recognized by . . . everyone . . . that as a fact freedom may
disappear . . . through the power of aggregated . . . money . . . .”) (emphasis added).
229. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
230. Id. at 75.
231. Otis v. Parker, 187 U.S. 606 (1903).
232. See id. at 610 (Holmes, J.).
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added a few lines in which he directly criticized Peckham’s line of
reasoning.233 These lines are the only indications in Lochner of what
Holmes thought Peckham did wrong. Holmes’s central charge against
Peckham was that he failed to adequately distinguish between ultimate and
proximate points of view.
To Holmes’s mind, Peckham treated his proximate feeling of
liberty—packaged as it was in the doctrine of the right to contract—as if it
had the same authority as an ultimate fact. “This case,” Holmes began, “is
decided upon an economic theory which a large part of the country does
not entertain.”234 Straightforward as it sounds, Holmes’s opening statement
actually targets two postulates underlying Peckham’s notion of liberty of
contract. The first postulate Holmes challenged was natural law. By
calling the right to contract an “economic theory,”235 Holmes defied
Peckham’s assumption that the right had the backing of a universal moral
system. Instead, Holmes argued, it was merely a policy preference. The
second postulate Holmes challenged with his opening line is the idea that
history has confirmed the existence of a right to contract. By pointing out
that “a large part of the country does not entertain”236 the right to contract,
Holmes was denying that historical experience was conclusive as to how
desirable the policy of liberty of contract was.237
Holmes then undermined the authority of liberty to contract by listing
a number of well-established American initiatives that did not jibe with the
new right: “school laws,” “the Post Office,” and “every state or municipal
[public project.]”238 Holmes also listed the Court’s recently decided
Northern Securities case because in it the Court upheld a statute Holmes
characterized as “cutting down the liberty to contract by way of
combination.”239 Together, these examples undermined both of Peckham’s
implicit postulates. Public schools, a government-subsidized postal system,
and public projects undermine the right to contract’s connection to natural
law because they were broadly accepted despite “tak[ing people’s] money
for purposes thought desirable, whether [they] like[] it or not.”240
Similarly, Northern Securities casts doubt on whether history had
confirmed the right to contract’s usefulness as an economic principle
233. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. See id. (“If it were a question whether I agreed with [the right to contract] I should
desire to study it further and long before making up my mind.”).
238. Id.
239. Id. (citing N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904)).
240. Id.
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because it enacted a widespread understanding that “the general [economic]
law of competition”241 was more important than the freedom to enter into
contracts.
In the end, Holmes’s main problem with Peckham’s opinion was that
it clashed with his picture of the ultimate world. His general practice was
to withhold unimpeachable authority from anything other than perceptible
facts and verifiable scientific theories.242 But Peckham took natural law
and liberty of contract as starting points even though they had not been
established as facts, and even though they had not been proven through
experimentation and observation. To Holmes’s mind, natural law was
nothing more than a collection of moral opinions, and liberty of contract
was simply an economic opinion. And “[g]eneral propositions,” Holmes
wrote in his Lochner opinion, “do not decide concrete cases.”243 For
Holmes, Americans’ habits were facts that had to be reconciled with any

241. N. Sec. Co., 193 U.S. at 338 (Harlan, J., plurality opinion) (quoting United States v.
Joint Traffic Ass’n, 171 U.S. 505, 569 (1898)).
242. See, e.g., Oliver W. Holmes, Remarks regarding Dr. S. Weir Mitchell, given at a
Tavern Club Dinner (Mar. 4, 1900), in OCCASIONAL SPEECHES, supra note 31, at 119, 120
(“Today the whole domain of truth concerning the visible world belongs to science.”).
Compare Oliver W. Holmes, Law and the Court, Speech at a Dinner of the Harvard Law
School Association of New York (Feb. 15, 1913), in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS, supra note
30, at 291, 292 (“Science has . . . made it legitimate to put everything to the test of proof.”),
with Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Frederick Pollock (Aug. 30, 1929), in THE ESSENTIAL
HOLMES, supra note 1, at 108, 108 (“I am far from believing [that there are phenomena for
which no causes can be discovered], but I am entirely ready to believe it on proof.”).
However, Holmes’s Northern Securities dissent—an opinion he wrote only a year before
Lochner—is a prominent example of Holmes straying from his usual reliance on facts and
scientific theories. In Northern Securities, Holmes argued that the Sherman Antitrust Act
violated the Commerce Clause because he equated the reach of the Commerce Clause with
his theory of combinations, and he thought the Act went beyond that limit. N. Sec. Co., 193
U.S. at 411 (Holmes, J., dissenting). As a result, Holmes’s Northern Securities opinion
rested on his unverified social theory, rather than on facts or on a scientific theory. Holmes
seemed to be aware that he had gone beyond the bounds of positivism in that case, telling
Laski,
I hope and believe that I am not influenced by my opinion that [the Sherman
Antitrust Act] is a foolish law. I have little doubt that the country likes it and I
always say, as you know, that if my fellow citizens want to go to Hell I will help
them. It’s my job.
Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Harold Laski (Mar. 4, 1920), in HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS
VOL. 1, supra note 48, at 248, 248–49.
243. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 76 (Holmes, J., dissenting); see also Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 HARV. L. REV. 443, 461 (1899) (“A generalization is
empty so far as it is general. Its value depends on the number of particulars which it calls
up . . . .”). This speech is also reprinted in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS, supra note 30, at 210,
as well as in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES, supra note 1, at 185.
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jurisprudential theory. Anything else, he said years later, would be a flight
into fantasy:
It now is recognized by legislatures and courts as well as by everyone
outside of them, that as a fact freedom may disappear on the one side or the
other through the power of aggregated money or men; . . . and to suppose
that every other force may exercise its compulsion at will but that
government has no authority to counteract the pressure with its own is
244
absurd.

III. THE ROMANTIC SIDE OF HOLMES’S LOCHNER DISSENT
In Part II my main goal was to unpack the critical elements of
Holmes’s Lochner dissent. I argued that Holmes took a positivistic
worldview to his analysis of the Lochner case. I also isolated the
individual arguments Holmes made in his Lochner dissent in order to show
that in that case (1) he rejected judicial supremacy; (2) he used Thayer’s
two propositions; and (3) he criticized Peckham’s majority opinion for
failing the test of positivism. In this Part my goal is more academic. My
overall argument is that Holmes connected his understanding of the judicial
role to his own intellectual salvation. Although Holmes’s personal faith
was not the primary reason for his deference to legislatures’ judgments, it
allowed him to gather up the strength and willpower he needed to go
through with what he understood to be his duty as a judge.
In a 1918 letter to the highly respected Judge Learned Hand, Holmes
explained his personal spin on Thayerianism with a parable.245 Holmes

244. Oliver W. Holmes, Draft of opinion of the Court, Keokee Consol. Coke Co. v.
Taylor, 234 U.S. 224 (1914), quoted in White, supra note 227, at 110–11. Although
Holmes removed this passage from the final draft of his Keokee opinion after four of his
colleagues objected to it, see Charles W. McCurdy, The “Liberty of Contract” Regime in
American Law, in THE STATE AND FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 161, 183 (Harry N. Scheiber ed.,
1998), only months later he covertly made the same point in Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1
(1915). In Coppage, the Court agreed with a liberty-of-contract challenge to a Kansas law,
id. at 26 (Pitney, J.), while Holmes dissented, id. at 26–27. But rather than explain his
reasons in his dissent, Holmes pointed to two previous Supreme Court cases where he
favored the preferences of a legislative majority over the right to liberty of contract
(Lochner; and Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908)), and to passages in two previous
Massachusetts cases where he described his theory of combinations (Vegelahn v. Guntner,
44 N.E. 1077 (Mass. 1896); and Plant v. Woods, 57 N.E. 1011 (Mass. 1900)). Coppage,
236 U.S. at 27. The point Holmes was making in Coppage was the same point he made in
his draft opinion in Keokee: the right to contract is not an authoritative theory because it
does not explain the facts of American culture.
245. Because both Hand and Holmes were Thayerians, see, e.g., Luban, supra note 192,
at 451, Holmes’s letter is significant. The letter was part of a dialogue concerning free
speech—specifically, whether a Thayerian judge should be less deferential to
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used four characters to describe the different mentalities judges could take
to their roles. As the story progresses, it becomes clear that the main
distinction between his characters is their respective attitudes toward
reformers. The implicit question Holmes presented with his parable is,
how should a judge feel about a radical who seems poised to change the
community around him? Holmes used his characters to sketch four distinct
attitudes, which are as follows:
1. The official person would have had contempt for a radical like
William Lloyd Garrison, who spent decades fighting for the complete and
immediate end of slavery. Because Garrison preferred “the very structure
of society [to] perish . . . than . . . [to] not have his way,”246 the official
person would not accept Garrison’s legitimacy. He would only be willing
to accept the existing order.
2. The son of Garrison looks at Garrison with more understanding. He
would argue that vital reforms always seem threatening at first, but that
society inevitably adjusts.247 From the son of Garrison’s perspective,
Garrison’s radical campaign against slavery seemed threatening for a time,
but when slavery finally ended the country was better for it. The son of
Garrison, then, is optimistic about what radicals can offer the orthodox.
3. The philosopher would be willing to give more credit to Garrison
than even the son of Garrison did. The philosopher would contend that a
society’s overall evolution depends on conservative and radical forces’
battle for the future.248 So unlike the son of Garrison, he would not view
radicals as mere contributors to mainstream society. He would instead see
them as the potential creators of the next orthodoxy.
4. The ironical man builds from the perspective of the philosopher—
Holmes actually calls him “the ironical man in the back of the
philosopher’s head.”249 Even while agreeing with the philosopher that
societies evolve through a series of paradigm shifts, the ironical man has a

political-branch officials when those officials regulate speech. See generally THOMAS
HEALY, THE GREAT DISSENT: HOW OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES CHANGED HIS MIND—AND
CHANGED THE HISTORY OF FREE SPEECH IN AMERICA 15–27 (2013); Gerald Gunther,
Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First Amendment Doctrine: Some Fragments of
History, 27 STAN. L. REV. 719, 722–45 (1975); Frederic R. Kellogg, Learned Hand and the
Great Train Ride, 56 AM. SCHOLAR 471, 478–86 (1987). For our purposes, and as I will
argue in this Part, Holmes’s letter is noteworthy because he used it as an occasion to identify
two different mindsets a Thayerian judge could have.
246. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to B. Learned Hand (June 24, 1918), in Gunther,
supra note 245, app. at 757.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
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secondary interest in social change: he makes the will of a majority
something he finds personal meaning in supporting.250
The point of Holmes’s story was to impress on Hand the idea that a
Thayerian judge should understand his duties both from the perspective of
the philosopher and from the perspective of the ironical man. He should
understand both that the life of a society evolves outside of lawyers’
theories of governments and that clearing the way for society to grow can
be a meaningful activity in its own right.
As it happens, the three opinions of the Lochner case provide good
illustrations of each of Holmes’s four characters. The official person and
the son of Garrison illustrate the limitations Peckham and Harlan
respectively placed on New York’s maximum-hours reformers.
Meanwhile, the philosopher and ironical man provide two levels of insight
into the approach Holmes took to his Lochner dissent. So by applying
Holmes’s parable to the Lochner case, we get a better picture of what
lesson Holmes had in mind for each character.
A. The Official Person
Like the official person, Peckham was suspicious of reform. In
Lochner, his assertive method of enforcing the right to contract against
New York’s legislature prevented the state’s reformers from enacting
maximum-hours laws in any industry the courts did not think of as
exceptional. Outside of a few unusually unhealthy industries, Peckham
argued, hours of work should not be left up to the “paternal wisdom” of
state legislatures.251 “It is unfortunately true that labor, even in any
department,” Peckham wrote, “may possibly carry with it the seeds of
unhealthiness. But are we all, on that account, at the mercy of legislative
majorities?”252 Peckham thought not. In his estimation, allowing states to
apply maximum-hours laws to any job that might threaten a worker’s
health would be too risky:
No trade, no occupation, no mode of earning one’s living, could escape this
all-pervading power, and the acts of the legislature in limiting the hours of
labor in all employments would be valid, although such limitation might
seriously cripple the ability of the laborer to support himself and his
253
family.

250. See infra text accompanying notes 259–306 (examining the significance of
Holmes’s ironical man).
251. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 60 (1905) (Peckham, J.).
252. Id. at 59 (Peckham, J.).
253. Id.
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B. The Son of Garrison
In Lochner, by only preventing maximum-hours-law reformers from
directly challenging the right to contract, Harlan took the son of Garrison’s
perspective. Harlan accepted that reformers had legitimate reasons for
wanting to limit the right to contract. In the decades before the Lochner
case, Harlan wrote in his dissent, there had been “an enormous increase in
the number of occupations which are dangerous, or so far detrimental to the
health of the employe[e]s as to demand special precautions for their
well-being and protection.”254 Striking a balance between workers’ health
and the right to contract, Harlan went on to say, “is not a question . . . in
respect of which there . . . can be absolute certainty.”255
Without
conclusive evidence one way or the other, Harlan reasoned that judges
should be ready to uphold any workplace reform measure that had a “real
or substantial relation” to health.256 If a reform law could do that, Harlan
would uphold it as consistent with the right to contract.
C. The Philosopher
By putting almost no restrictions on reform laws, Holmes’s Thayerian
approach to new social movements mirrored the philosopher’s point of
view. As Holmes explained in the 1921 case Truax v. Corrigan,257 judges
should not be in the business of overriding popular reforms:
There is nothing that I more deprecate than the use of the Fourteenth
Amendment beyond the absolute compulsion of its words to prevent the
making of social experiments that an important part of the community
desires, in the insulated chambers afforded by the several States, even
though the experiments may seem futile or even noxious to me and to those
258
whose judgment I most respect.

While in Lochner neither Peckham nor Harlan would consider justifying
the ten-hour law outside of the newly established liberty of contract
254. Id. at 66 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 391–92
(1898)).
255. Id. at 72 (emphasis added).
256. Id. at 69.
257. Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921). In Truax, the Court held that an Arizona
anti-injunction law violated the Due Process Clause’s protections of liberty and property.
Id. at 330 (Taft, C.J.). The Due Process Clause says that a state cannot “deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
The Truax Court also held that the Arizona law violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause. Truax, 257 U.S. at 334 (Taft, C.J.). The Equal Protection Clause says
that a state cannot “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
258. Truax, 257 U.S. at 344 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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orthodoxy, Holmes was willing to let New York’s reformers abandon that
paradigm altogether. If they had responded to prevailing bakeshop
conditions with a paternalistic understanding of liberty, he would not use
the Fourteenth Amendment to get in their way. The Constitution, he
believed, was made for them too.
D. The Ironical Man
By far the most mysterious perspective Holmes listed in his letter to
Hand was the ironical man in the back of the philosopher’s head—a second
angle from which a Thayerian judge could approach his duties. In his short
parable, Holmes organized his four characters into a hierarchy. Holmes
preferred the son of Garrison to the official person, and the philosopher to
the son of Garrison.259 Incredibly—because the philosopher seems to
adequately explain the logic a Thayerian judge would use—Holmes
preferred the ironical man to the philosopher.260 For Holmes, it was not
enough to accept the philosopher’s insight that social evolution was far too
complicated to predict. Rather, it was important to pursue the ironical
man’s project of turning a judge’s duty into something that feels rewarding.
The ironical man was Holmes’s method of personally investing
himself in the spirit of a legislative majority. And in order to do that, he
had to venture beyond the safety of his positivism.261 Holmes’s preferred
alternative to positivism was his conception of philosophy.262 As law
professor Thomas Grey has explained, Holmes considered “philosophy [to]
encompass[] all forms of broad and speculative thought that claimed
intrinsic intellectual interest. Above all it included what we might call
social theory—work involving broad generalizations about human society
that rested loosely on scholarly findings, but which went beyond them to
guide further research and speculation.”263

259. See Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to B. Learned Hand (June 24, 1918), in Gunther,
supra note 245, app. at 757.
260. See id.
261. See generally Oliver W. Holmes, Remarks regarding Dr. S. Weir Mitchell, given at
a Tavern Club Dinner (Mar. 4, 1900), in OCCASIONAL SPEECHES, supra note 31, at 119, 120
(“Today the whole domain of truth concerning the visible world belongs to science.”). This
speech is also reprinted in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES, supra note 1, at 48.
262. See, e.g., Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Patrick A. Sheehan (Dec. 15, 1912), in
THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES, supra note 1, at 28, 29 (“[O]nly the philosophical side of things
interests me . . . .”).
263. Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L. REV. 787, 841
(1989); see Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Harold Laski (Feb. 6, 1925), in HOLMES-LASKI
LETTERS VOL. 1, supra note 48, at 705, 706 (“I regard philosophy as simply the broader
generalizations of thought that can’t lift itself by the slack of its own breeches.”).

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol39/iss2/5

44

Yoder: The Americanism of Justice Holmes

2017]

THE AMERICANISM OF JUSTICE HOLMES

397

As early as 1886, Holmes had a fully formed idea of how he could
enlist his philosophical ideas in the project of going beyond the raw facts of
a case in such a way as to “live greatly in the law.”264 In a lecture called
The Profession of the Law, he asked a group of Harvard undergraduates,
“What is [the work of a legal professional] to my soul?”265 The answer,
Holmes concluded, was finding what he called an “infinite perspective”266:
The main part of intellectual education is not the acquisition of facts, but
learning how to make facts live. . . . The mark of a master is, that facts
which before lay scattered in an inorganic mass, when he shoots through
them the magnetic current of his thought, leap into an organic order, and
267
live and bear fruit.

Although lawyers and judges were bound to deal in facts, Holmes was
telling the students that any practical grouping of facts could be
philosophically mastered to an extent that could, at the very highest levels
at least, be molded into something that is proximately rewarding.268

264. Oliver W. Holmes, The Profession of the Law, Lecture to Undergraduates of
Harvard University (Feb. 17, 1886), in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS, supra note 30, at 29, 30.
This speech is also available in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES, supra note 1, at 218.
265. Id. at 29.
266. Id. at 30 (emphasis added).
267. Oliver W. Holmes, The Use of Law Schools, Speech before the Harvard Law
School Association at Harvard University’s 250th anniversary (Nov. 5, 1886), in
OCCASIONAL SPEECHES, supra note 31, at 34, 35–36. This speech is also reprinted in THE
ESSENTIAL HOLMES, supra note 1, at 224. This passage comes from a speech called The Use
of Law Schools—delivered the same year and place Holmes delivered The Profession of the
Law. In The Profession of the Law itself, Holmes described the infinite perspective this
way: “All that life offers any man from which to start his thinking or his striving is a
fact. . . . [Y]our business as thinkers is to make plainer the way from some [fact] to the
whole of things; to show the rational connection between your fact and the frame of the
universe.” Oliver W. Holmes, The Profession of the Law, Lecture to undergraduates of
Harvard University (Feb. 17, 1886), in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS, supra note 30, at 29, 30.
268. See, e.g., Oliver W. Holmes, The Law, Remarks at a Suffolk Bar Association
Dinner (Feb. 5, 1885), in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES, supra note 1, at 221, 224 (“[I]f a man is a
specialist, it is most desirable that he should also [have broad interests]; that he
should . . . . be able not only to explain, but to feel; that the ardors of intellectual pursuit
should be relieved by the charms of art . . . .”). Holmes’s infinite perspective sheds light on
another one of Holmes’s major intellectual influences: Ralph Waldo Emerson. See, e.g.,
MENAND, supra note 34, at 23–25, 57–59. As Menand points out, Holmes’s infinite
perspective echoed a passage in Emerson’s 1837 essay The American Scholar. Id. at 60.
The passage reads as follows: “[S]how me the sublime presence of the highest spiritual
cause lurking, . . . in [the] suburbs and extremities of nature; let me see every trifle bristling
with the polarity that ranges it instantly on an eternal law . . . .” Ralph Waldo Emerson, The
American Scholar, in THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS OF RALPH WALDO EMERSON 43, 57 (Brooks
Atkinson ed., Modern Library 2000) (1837).
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The essential facts Lochner presented Holmes with were simple. A
legislative majority in New York, invoking the idea that it was unhealthy
for bakers to work excessively long hours, passed a law limiting bakers to
ten hours of work per day. In Holmes’s hands, these humble facts were all
he needed to “pass in reason from one part [of the universe] to
another . . . by the path of the air,”269 all the way up to something he could
proximately connect with.
Holmes first lifted off from the Lochner facts with philosophy. The
philosophical theory he used to explain reformers’ efforts to enact the
maximum-hours law, of course, was his law of combinations. Holmes
believed that by backing the ten-hour law, New York’s unionized bakers
were behaving like any rational combination should. They were looking
out for themselves, even if it came at the expense of others. If the bakers
thought they could improve their lives by gathering up political support for
the ten-hour provision, Holmes would not intervene. He saw no qualitative
difference between limiting master bakers’ practical freedom through
legislation, and limiting it through collective action270—unions’ traditional
and more-or-less accepted method of applying pressure on employers.271
Whether their aims were radical or not, the bakers and their Progressive
boosters had proven their power.
Once Holmes had built a bridge from the bare facts of the Lochner
case to the idea that the ten-hour law represented the will of a dominant
combination, it was not hard for him to complete the circle on his infinite
perspective. All that was left for Holmes to do was embrace the bakers’
and Progressives’ successful lobbying campaign with his own proximate
truth. When Holmes had the ironical man tell Hand that we are all fated to

269. Oliver W. Holmes, The Profession of the Law, Lecture to Undergraduates of
Harvard University (Feb. 17, 1886), in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS, supra note 30, at 29, 30.
270. In fact, a year after Lochner was decided, American Federation of Labor-founder
Samuel Gompers reported that “to a large extent” New York’s unionized bakers had
“secured the ten hour work day” by taking collective action. Samuel Gompers, Speech to
Quarterly Meeting of Cigarmakers’ Union No. 144 (Apr. 26, 1906), quoted in WILLIAM E.
FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT 42 n.28 (1991).
271. See generally GERALD G. EGGERT, RAILROAD LABOR DISPUTES: THE BEGINNINGS OF
FEDERAL STRIKE POLICY 24–225 (1967) (highlighting the judiciary’s role in launching
federal labor-relations policy between the great railroad strikes of 1877 and the Erdman Act
of 1898); FORBATH, supra note 270, at 59–127, 193–98 app. B (discussing how courts
addressed strikes, boycotts, picketing, and secondary actions from the Gilded Age through
1930); Gary Minda, The Common Law, Labor and Antitrust, 11 INDUS. REL. L.J. 461,
479–90, 493–518 (1989) (describing labor law as moving through three conceptual stages
before the emergence of modern antitrust law in 1911 and the passage of the National Labor
Relations Act in 1935).
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“fight” our “Enem[ies,]”272 he left a critical clue as to how he could have
placed New York’s little bakeshop regulation within the ambit of his own
proximate faith. As a judge, Holmes saw it as his duty to embrace a
majority’s will with the discipline and recklessness of the ideal soldier.
And for Holmes the ideal soldier had a name: Henry Abbott, a Union major
he fought alongside as a young man, and someone he had “admired” and
“loved.”273
Compared to Holmes’s other intellectual influences,274 Abbott seems
to come out of left field. He wrote nothing significant during his short life,
and there is no evidence that he had any particular interest in the world of
ideas. But Holmes saved Abbott a spot among his short list of heroes
because of how he lived. As Pulitzer Prize-winner Louis Menand
explained in his book The Metaphysical Club, Abbott was an exceptionally
brave Unionist despite being indifferent to the Union’s articles of faith.
Shortly after enlisting, Menand writes,
[Abbott] astonished himself by his own coolness under fire. It was a talent
he had no idea he possessed, and in every engagement afterward he seems
to have gone out of his way to place himself in the greatest possible danger.
But he was contemptuous of the cause for which he fought. He
admired [General George B.] McClellan as a military professional and a
Democrat, and complained continually of the political generals in the army.
When the Emancipation Proclamation went into effect, . . . Abbott wrote
[home] . . . to explain that “[t]he president’s proclamation is of course
275
received with universal disgust.”

Despite rejecting Abbott’s attitude toward slavery,276 Holmes
celebrated him in his moving Memorial Day speech twenty years after he

272. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to B. Learned Hand (June 24, 1918), in Gunther,
supra note 245, app. at 757.
273. Oliver W. Holmes, Memorial Day, Address before John Sedgwick Post No. 4,
Grand Army of the Republic, in Keene, N.H. (May 30, 1884), in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES,
supra note 1, at 80, 85. Law professor G. Edward White has identified these comments as
pertaining to Abbott. See WHITE, supra note 22, at 78–79.
274. Menand calls Abbott’s death “a touchstone in [Holmes’s mature] thought.”
MENAND, supra note 34, at 54.
275. Id. at 40 (quoting Letter from Henry L. Abbott to Elizabeth Livermore (Jan. 10,
1863), in FALLEN LEAVES: THE CIVIL WAR LETTERS OF MAJOR HENRY LIVERMORE ABBOTT
160, 161 (Robert Garth Scott ed., 1991)).
276. See Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Oliver W. Holmes, Sr. (Dec. 20, 1862), in
TOUCHED WITH FIRE: CIVIL WAR LETTERS AND DIARY OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR.,
1861–1864, at 79, 79 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1946) [hereinafter TOUCHED WITH FIRE] (“I
never I believe have shown . . . any wavering in my belief in the right of [the Union’s] cause
. . . .”); Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to John C. H. Wu (June 21, 1928), in BOOK NOTICES
AND UNCOLLECTED LETTERS, supra note 20, at 196, 197 (“[I]n my youth I was an
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was killed in the Battle of the Wilderness.277 There, Holmes would recount
“the awful spectacle of his advance [on] . . . the streets of
Fredericksburg.”278 Under Virginia’s pale December sun, Holmes told his
audience, Abbott had shown his “few surviving companions” the face of
God:
In less than sixty seconds he would become the focus of a hidden and
annihilating fire from a semicircle of houses. His first platoon had
vanished under it in an instant, ten men falling dead by his side. He had
quietly turned back to where the other half of his company was
waiting, . . . and was [soon leading a second platoon forward,] . . . in
obedience to superior command, to certain and useless death . . . . The end
was distant only a few seconds; but if you had seen him with his indifferent
carriage, and sword swinging from his finger like a cane, you never would
have suspected that he was doing more than conducting a company drill on
279
the camp parade ground.

The miracle Abbott performed was that of facing down the cruelty of
ultimate reality with serenity and grace. He had little choice but to depend
on the Union for his and his family’s survival. Born a Northerner,280 he
took up arms for the Federals purely out of loyalty to his side. And Holmes
would not have it any other way. Violence, he believed, was human
existence at its most honest and most elemental.281 “[M]an’s destiny is to
fight,” the ironical man said; “[t]herefore, take thy place on the one side or
the other.”282 In his famous 1895 speech The Soldier’s Faith, Holmes
summed up his conviction that war is inescapable: “I believe that the
struggle for life is the order of the world, at which it is vain to

abolitionist and shuddered at a Negro Minstrel Show, as belittling a suffering race and I am
glad I was and did.”).
277. See Oliver W. Holmes, Memorial Day, Address before John Sedgwick Post No. 4,
Grand Army of the Republic, in Keene, N.H. (May 30, 1884), in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES,
supra note 1, at 80, 84 (“In the Wilderness . . . [Abbott] fell.”).
278. Id.
279. Id. at 84–85.
280. See Robert Garth Scott, Introduction in FALLEN LEAVES: THE CIVIL WAR LETTERS
OF MAJOR HENRY LIVERMORE ABBOTT, supra note 275, at 1, 1–2 (discussing Abbott’s early
life and the Abbott family’s Massachusetts roots).
281. See, e.g., Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Frederick Pollock (Feb. 1, 1920), in THE
ESSENTIAL HOLMES, supra note 1, at 102, 102–03 (“I do think that man at present is a
predatory animal. . . . I believe that force . . . is the ultima ratio, and between two groups
that want to make inconsistent kinds of world I see no remedy except force.”).
282. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to B. Learned Hand (June 24, 1918), in Gunther,
supra note 245, app. at 757.
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repine. . . . Now, at least, and perhaps as long as man dwells upon the
globe, his destiny is battle, and he has to take the chances of war.”283
Abbott’s display in Fredericksburg shook Holmes to his core because
it proved he had put his duty to his homeland above all else—his life, his
politics, and even his judgment. Holmes thought Abbott’s assault was
sublime, Menand points out, specifically because he “exposed
himself . . . to danger . . . despite knowing that the order to advance was
stupid, and despite a complete antipathy toward the cause in whose name
he was, for all he knew, about to die.”284 For the rest of his life, Holmes
would hold Abbott’s faith up as his north star: “I do not know the meaning
of the universe,”285 Holmes wrote in The Soldier’s Faith,
[b]ut in the midst of doubt, in the collapse of creeds, there is one thing I do
not doubt, . . . and that is that the faith is true and adorable which leads a
soldier to throw away his life in obedience to a blindly accepted duty, in a
cause which he little understands, in a plan of campaign of which he has no
286
notion, under tactics of which he does not see the use.

Under the guidance of Abbott’s example, Holmes was able to cobble a
proximate faith together that could complete the circle on his infinite
perspective. To Holmes, “[t]he great forces which insured the North
success”287 and the relative strength of “legions” held only the shallow
significance of being the facts that directed the War’s course.288 So, too,
were the ideologies and the opinions289 that made the Civil War

283. Oliver W. Holmes, The Soldier’s Faith, Address to the graduating class of Harvard
University (May 30, 1895), in OCCASIONAL SPEECHES, supra note 31, at 73, 75.
284. MENAND, supra note 34, at 43. Privately, both Holmes and Abbott believed the
Fredericksburg assault was ill-advised and reckless. See Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to
Oliver W. Holmes, Sr. (Dec. 20, 1862), in TOUCHED WITH FIRE, supra note 276, at 79, 79
(calling Fredericksburg “an infamous butchery in a ridiculous attempt”); Letter from Henry
L. Abbott to Caroline L. Abbott (Dec. 21, 1862), in FALLEN LEAVES, supra note 275, at 155,
155 (“[T]he men who ordered the crossing of the river [into Fredericksburg] are responsible
to God for murder.”).
285. Oliver W. Holmes, The Soldier’s Faith, Address to the graduating class of Harvard
University (May 30, 1895), in OCCASIONAL SPEECHES, supra note 31, at 73, 76.
286. Id.
287. Oliver W. Holmes, Harvard College in the War, Answer to a toast at Harvard
University commencement (June 25, 1884), in OCCASIONAL SPEECHES, supra note 31, at 17,
17.
288. Id. at 17–18.
289. See, e.g., Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Frederick Pollock (Aug. 30, 1929), in
THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES, supra note 1, at 108, 108–09 (saying that “persecution [came]
easy” for Calvinists, Catholics, abolitionists, and prohibitionists because they “kn[e]w that
[they] kn[e]w”).
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inevitable.290 A war and all the forces that feed it are merely a “horrible”
opening into the eternal “tempestuous untamed streaming of the world.”291
But mankind’s need for proximate meaning does not stop when the terrors
of life are unleashed. To embrace violence and death like Abbott had was
to turn the reality of life’s ugliness on its head. In the name of “roman[ce]”
and “glory,”292 he was able to “toss life and hope like a flower before the
feet of [his] country.”293 And that miracle is exactly where the ironical man
picks up. “[T]he Enemy is as good a man as thou,” Holmes had the
ironical man tell Hand, “but kill him if thou Canst.”294
Just as Holmes’s need for proximate meaning led him to adopt the
ideal soldier’s belief in “my country right or wrong,”295 it also led him to
adopt his conception of the ideal judge.296 The ironical man’s passion, like
Abbott’s, was the secret of his personal redemption: regarding the mean
and unforgiving reality of the ultimate world as a mere occasion to let his
proximate light shine.297 Because in Holmes’s cosmos all events were
purely physical, he could embrace any of them as small parts of the
whole.298 With the figure of the ironical man, Holmes applied that
willingness to embrace what exists to the cases that came to him as a judge.

290. See Oliver W. Holmes, Memorial Day, Address before John Sedgwick Post No. 4,
Grand Army of the Republic, in Keene, N.H. (May 30, 1884), in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES,
supra note 1, at 80, 80 (“[M]any of us . . . believed that the [Civil War] was inevitable.”).
291. Oliver W. Holmes, The Soldier’s Faith, Address to the graduating class of Harvard
University (May 30, 1895), in OCCASIONAL SPEECHES, supra note 31, at 73, 80.
292. Oliver W. Holmes, Harvard College in the War, Answer to a toast at Harvard
University commencement (June 25, 1884), in OCCASIONAL SPEECHES, supra note 31, at 17,
18.
293. Id. at 19. Holmes used these particular words to describe “men like” Robert Gould
Shaw, a Union officer who died during the Civil War. Id.
294. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to B. Learned Hand (June 24, 1918), in Gunther,
supra note 245, app. at 757.
295. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Lewis Einstein (Oct. 12, 1914), in THE ESSENTIAL
HOLMES, supra note 1, at 101, 101.
296. In The Common Law, Holmes described an ideal legal regime in similar terms:
“The first requirement of a sound body of law is, that it should correspond with the actual
feelings and demands of the community, whether right or wrong.” THE COMMON LAW,
supra note 202, at 41.
297. See, e.g., Oliver W. Holmes, Commencement Address at Brown University (June
17, 1897), in OCCASIONAL SPEECHES, supra note 31, at 97, 99 (“It seems to me that this is
the key to intellectual salvation . . . is to accept a like faith in one’s heart, and to be not
merely a necessary but a willing instrument in working out the inscrutable end.”).
298. See, e.g., Civil War Diary of Oliver W. Holmes, quoted in TOUCHED WITH FIRE,
supra note 276, at 23, 28 (“[W]hatever shall happen is best—for . . . good & universal (or
general law) are synonymous terms in the universe—(I can now add that our phrase good
only means certain general truths seen through the heart & will . . . .)”).
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Seeing the economic and political forces that made their way to the Court
as mere facts of his environment,299 Holmes could accept them as easily as
he could accept any other corner of the universe. He endeavored to
“sympathize[]” with the “social structure,” he once told Laski, “as [he did]
in many of [his] literary and philosophical judgments.”300 The truth of the
ironical man, then, is that while he sees his country through a positivistic
lens, he does not stop there. He goes further by deciding to think of it as
good and right. He chooses to make the trajectory of his nation a part of
who he is.
The ironical man, in short, simply describes Holmes’s method of
taking the cases he encountered as a judge, and doing what he could to
emotionally connect with the realities behind them. As he told the Suffolk
Bar Association in 1885, a “civilized” professional “should [not only] have
laid in the outline of the other sciences . . . he should [also] be passionate”
about the facts he encounters.301 And when Holmes wrote Hand to rank the
philosopher’s realism below the ironical man’s romanticism, he was saying
that a purely technical understanding of his work would be meaningless
without a proximate connection to it. “A man of intellect,” he reminded
Laski in a 1925 letter, “ought to . . . recogniz[e society’s] . . . unimportance
as compared with his superlatives.”302 In a 1911 address to Harvard
College’s class of 1861, Holmes explained how the romance of
war—which he felt as strongly in college as he did in the
battlefield—showed him why it is vital to add a gloss of sentimentality to
the realities of social life:
[W]e all of us have our notions of what is best. I learned in the regiment
and in the class the conclusion, at least, of what I think the best service that
we can do for our country and for ourselves: To see so far as one may, and
to feel, the great forces that are behind every detail—for that makes all the
difference between philosophy and gossip, [and] between great action and
303
small.

299. See, e.g., Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 252 (1903)
(Holmes, J.) (“[T]he taste of any public is not to be treated with contempt. It is a[] . . . fact
for the moment . . . .”).
300. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Harold Laski (Nov. 3, 1927), in HAROLD-LASKI
LETTERS VOL. 2, supra note 4, at 990, 991.
301. Oliver W. Holmes, The Law, Remarks at a Suffolk Bar Association Dinner (Feb. 5,
1885), in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES, supra note 1, at 221, 224.
302. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Harold Laski (Mar. 26, 1925), in THE ESSENTIAL
HOLMES, supra note 1, at 49, 50.
303. Oliver W. Holmes, The Class of ‘61, Remarks at the Fiftieth Anniversary of
Graduation (June 28, 1911), in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES, supra note 1, at 94, 94.
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When Holmes considered a case from the perspective of the ironical
man, he did everything he could to live up to that lofty standard. In 1902,
mere weeks before joining the Supreme Court, he told the Chicago Bar
Association that if a judge “aims at the highest, he must take risks. He
must be superior to class prejudices and to his own prejudices. . . . He must
throw down his naked thought . . . to take its chance for life.”304 But above
all, Holmes told his peers, a judge who aspires to greatness “must try to
realize the paradox that it is not necessary to be heavy in order to have
weight.”305 Time has shown that in Lochner, Holmes hit that incredible
mark. Despite being personally ambivalent about maximum-hours laws,306
he put everything he had behind the Bakeshop Act, as well as the
prevailing opinions that supported it. In an opinion that is as to-the-point
as it is unpretentious, he managed to lift a tedious dispute over a New York
bakeshop regulation up into something that moves us like poetry. What
Holmes must have known, and what generations of lawyers have always
known, is that in Lochner his beautiful soul sang at the same pitch as New
Yorkers’ rude politics. On April 17, 1905, the day Holmes delivered his
Lochner dissent, the ironical man was realized.
CONCLUSION
Eight years after the Court issued its Lochner decision, in a speech
called Law and the Court, Holmes walked the Harvard Law School
Association through his observations of the judiciary, his Americanist faith,
and the arc of the nation. Throughout his discussion, his palpable concern
was the rise and expected fall of the right to liberty of contract and other
“doctrines that had no proper place in the Constitution or the common
law.”307 At the time he delivered his speech, Holmes had good reasons for

304. Oliver W. Holmes, Despondency and Hope, Remarks at a dinner of the Chicago
Bar Association (Oct. 21, 1902), in OCCASIONAL SPEECHES, supra note 31, at 146, 148. This
speech is also available in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES, supra note 1, at 149.
305. Id.
306. In 1907, Holmes privately told Sheehan, “I incline to believe a magazine article to
the effect that before our clamorers for 8 hours (with which clamor I rather sympathize)
know it, the Chinese with their endless gluttony for work, their honesty and their
imperturbable patience will cut the white races out in the markets of the world.” Letter from
Oliver W. Holmes to Patrick A. Sheehan (Sept. 17, 1907), in HOLMES-SHEEHAN
CORRESPONDENCE, supra note 46, at 18, 18–19.
307. Oliver W. Holmes, Law and the Court, Speech at a Dinner of the Harvard Law
School Association (Feb. 15, 1913), in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS, supra note 30, at 291,
295. This speech is also reprinted in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES, supra note 1, at 145.
Although Holmes never identified the right to contract by name, it was certainly on his
mind. In his speech he referred to constitutional doctrines (1) that were recognized in the
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being mindful of the forces that brought doctrines like the right to contract
to the fore. During the decade and a half that followed Allgeyer, the Court
was a restrained defender of the new right.308 But by the time Holmes
addressed his audience in 1913, liberty of contract seemed to be on its way
out.309 Rather than directly attacking the fading right, however, Holmes
remained circumspect. Understanding that his colleagues were reliably
hostile to labor310 and suspicious of paternalist reformers,311 Holmes was
not ready to predict its demise. Instead, he contextualized the story of
twenty years preceding 1913; (2) that were reactions to socialism; and (3) that he considered
to be improper. Id. Based on these criteria, the right to contract fits the bill very nicely. See
supra Section II.A (discussing the rise of the right to contract); supra text accompanying
notes 112–15 (identifying the right to contract as a reaction to socialism); supra Section II.C
(describing Holmes’s opposition to the right to contract).
308. See Bernstein, supra note 97, at 10 (“The first period [of the Lochner era informally
began in 1897 with Allgeyer] and ended in about 1911, with moderate Lochnerians
dominating the Court.”). But see Friedman, supra note 210, at 1449 (“The period
immediately before 1890 was one in which the Court permitted a great deal of novel
state regulation . . . . But all that seemed to change suddenly [between 1890 and the
mid-1920s]. . . . [W]hat may seem [today] . . . to be a small absolute number of overrulings
looked like a sea change to observers . . . at the time.”).
309. See Bernstein, supra note 97, at 10 (“[F]rom approximately 1911 to 1923, . . . the
Court, while not explicitly repudiating Lochner, generally refus[ed] to expand the
liberty-of-contract doctrine to new scenarios, and at times seem[ed] to drastically limit the
doctrine.”). As law professor Jack Balkin notes, “[F]ollowing Harding’s election in 1920
and four new appointments to the Supreme Court, the Court revived the principles of
Lochner in 1923 in Adkins v. Children’s Hospital of the District of Columbia [261 U.S. 525
(1923)].” Balkin, supra note 13, at 684–85 (footnote omitted). The Lochner era is often
considered to have ended for good in 1937 with West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S.
379 (1937). See Balkin, supra note 13, at 685.
310. See JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIP OF MELVILLE W. FULLER,
1888–1910, at 81 (1995) (“[T]he Fuller Court [of 1888 to 1910] was reluctant to sanction
government intervention to strengthen the legal position of industrial workers and encourage
the formation of labor unions”); David E. Bernstein, Lochner’s Legacy’s Legacy, 82 TEX. L.
REV. 1, 39 (2003) (asserting that the Lochner-era Court consistently invalidated “laws that it
believed had no purpose other than to aid labor unions.”); Daniel A. Farber, Who Killed
Lochner?, 90 GEO. L.J. 985, 988 (2002) (book review) (“The Lochner-era’s philosophy may
be best encapsulated in the Court’s recognition of a constitutional right of employers to fire
union members. . . . [T]he Court rejected the legitimacy of any state effort to deal with
unequal bargaining power . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
311. See David L. Shapiro, Courts, Legislatures, and Paternalism, 74 VA. L. REV. 519,
539 (1988) (“During the Lochner era, the Court [only] rarely, and grudgingly, allowed
legislatures to make some paternalist inroads . . . at least in matters of contract.”); Aviam
Soifer, The Paradox of Paternalism and Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism: United States
Supreme Court, 1888–1921, 5 LAW & HIST. REV. 249, 255 (1987) (saying that from 1888 to
1921 “[t]he Justices[] . . . devoted themselves tenaciously to rooting out paternalism
whenever they perceived it.”); Sunstein, supra note 16, at 877 (“[T]here can be no doubt
that most forms of redistribution and paternalism were ruled out [during the Lochner era].”).
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doctrines like the right to contract within the ongoing ideological battle
between those who were inclined to tradition and laissez-faire, and those
who preferred reform and paternalism.
To Holmes, the story of doctrines like liberty of contract began with
the backwards-looking legal framework to which laissez-faire capitalists
and labor and paternalist activists had to take their disputes. “I told a labor
leader once,” Holmes recalled in his speech, “that what they asked was
favor, and if a decision was against them they called it wicked. The same
might be said of their opponents. It means that the law is growing.”312 But,
he continued, it would be some time before labor and capital could both
accept the legitimacy of the laws that applied to them. Although the law
never fails to evolve with the problems it must resolve,
[i]t cannot be helped . . . that the law is behind the times. . . . [L]aw
embodies beliefs that have triumphed in the battle of ideas and then have
translated themselves into action, while there is still doubt, while opposite
convictions still keep a battle front against each other, the time for law has
313
not come; the notion destined to prevail is not yet entitled to the field.

In order to minimize the lag between what the law says and what most
interested parties agree it should be, Holmes argued that “[w]e . . . need
[an] education in the obvious—to learn to transcend our own convictions
and to leave room for much that we hold dear to be done away with short
of revolution by the orderly change of law.”314 But Holmes was not bullish
on his colleagues’ capacities to rise above their economic and political
opinions. After thirty years on the bench, he told his audience that “[i]t is a
misfortune [that] judge[s] read[] [their] conscious or unconscious
sympath[ies] with one side or the other prematurely into the law.”315 It was
a problem, he regretted to say, he did not see ending anytime soon: “Judges
are apt to be naif, simple-minded men, and they need something of [a]
Mephistopheles.”316
During the two decades that saw the Court’s first recognition of the
right to contract, and that saw its rise and eventual dip, Holmes thought the
most significant barrier to the law’s continued evolution was his fellow
judges’ fear of socialism. In his 1897 speech The Path of the Law, for
example, he argued that

312. Oliver W. Holmes, Law and the Court, Speech at a Dinner of the Harvard Law
School Association of New York (Feb. 15, 1913), in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS, supra note
30, at 291, 294.
313. Id. at 294–95.
314. Id. at 295.
315. Id.
316. Id.
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[w]hen socialism first began to be talked about, the comfortable classes of
the community were a good deal frightened. I suspect that this fear has
influenced judicial action both here and in England . . . . [I]n some courts
new principles have been discovered . . . which may be generalized into
acceptance of the economic doctrines which prevailed about fifty years
ago, and a wholesale prohibition of what a tribunal of lawyers does not
317
think about right.

Sixteen years later, when Holmes delivered his Law and the Court address,
he had not changed his tune: “When twenty years ago a vague terror went
over the earth and the word socialism began to be heard, I thought and still
think that fear was translated into” illegitimate constitutional and
common-law doctrines.318
Holmes understood the gravity of his colleagues’ fears because he
feared for the country’s future, too. “I feel what are perhaps an old man’s
apprehensions,”319 he revealed to the Harvard group. Convinced that
socialists and Progressives had used “economic superstition”320 to stoke the
“present discontents,”321 he predicted that it would be “a slow business for
our people to reach rational views.”322 He also worried that “competition
from new races [and] . . . working men’s disputes” would “test whether we
can hang together and can fight.”323 And he suspected that the country was
“running through the world’s resources at a pace that [it] [could not]
keep.”324 But unlike his fellow Justices, Holmes would not use his fears as
an excuse to interfere with the country’s evolution, and he would not block
the direction legislative majorities wanted to go with new constitutional
doctrines like liberty of contract. A Thayerian through and through, he

317. Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, Speech at dedication of new hall of the
Boston University School of Law (Jan. 8, 1897), in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS, supra note
30, at 167, 184. This speech is also reproduced in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES, supra note 1, at
160.
318. Oliver W. Holmes, Law and the Court, Speech at a Dinner of the Harvard Law
School Association of New York (Feb. 15, 1913), in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS, supra note
30, at 291, 295.
319. Id. at 296.
320. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Lewis Einstein (Nov. 24, 1912), in THE ESSENTIAL
HOLMES, supra note 1, at 66, 66.
321. Oliver W. Holmes, Law and the Court, Speech at a Dinner of the Harvard Law
School Association of New York (Feb. 15, 1913), in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS, supra note
30, at 291, 294.
322. Id. at 296, reprinted in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES, supra note 1, at 148.
323. Id.
324. Id.
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would instead carry out whatever instructions legislative majorities would
send his way.325
As far back as 1893, Holmes agreed with Thayer’s view that “[i]t is
idle to rely upon Courts ‘to save a people from ruin.’”326 It was, for
Holmes, a central reason for keeping to his hands-off theory of the judicial
role, even as he sat atop the judicial branch. “I have no belief in panaceas
and almost none in sudden ruin,” Holmes told the Association members.327
Instead, he explained,
I believe with Montesquieu that if the chance of a battle—I may add, the
passage of a law—has ruined a state, there was a general cause at work that
made the state ready to perish by a single battle or a law. Hence I am not
much interested one way or the other in the [redistributive] nostrums now
so strenuously urged. . . . For most of the things that properly can be called
evils in the present state of the law I think the main remedy, as for the evils
328
of public opinion, is for us to grow more civilized.

In Lochner, because Holmes did not think judges could save their
societies, he did not share Peckham’s objection to leaving the country “at
the mercy of legislative majorities.”329 “Every opinion,” he argued in his
dissent, “tends to become a law.”330 The country had risen thanks to the
“displays of intellect, force of character, and power of divination”331 of
nameless multitudes, and its destiny belonged to the same. “Everything
tells in its due proportion, in the organic processes of social growth,”332
Holmes told a Boston University crowd in 1890. “Nature knows no such
thing as a force not counting for its full number of foot-pounds.”333

325. In 1912, only a few months before his Law and the Court speech, Holmes recalled
telling sitting president William Howard Taft that “if they could make a case for putting
Rockefeller in prison I should do my part; but if they left it to me I should put up a bronze
statue of him.” Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Lewis Einstein (Oct. 28, 1912), in THE
ESSENTIAL HOLMES, supra note 1, at 141, 141.
326. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to James B. Thayer (Nov. 2, 1893), in Luban, supra
note 192, at 462 n.34 (quoting Thayer, supra note 176, at 156).
327. Oliver W. Holmes, Law and the Court, Speech at a Dinner of the Harvard Law
School Association of New York (Feb. 15, 1913), in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS, supra note
30, at 291, 295.
328. Id. at 295–96.
329. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 59 (1905) (Peckham, J.).
330. Id. at 76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
331. Oliver W. Holmes, Anonymity and Achievement, Remarks at a dinner of the
Alumni of the Boston University Law School (June 3, 1890), in OCCASIONAL SPEECHES,
supra note 31, at 59, 59.
332. Id. at 61.
333. Id.
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Fearing for the country’s future, and unwilling to interfere with the
Republic’s course, Holmes would not tie his ironclad patriotism334 to the
fate of his nation or even to his culture. “There are half a dozen
futures . . . for our civilization,” Holmes once told the Irish historian Alice
Stopford Green, “that seem to me equally probable and among them is the
possibility of [one] cutting its own throat or of one going down hill in some
way.”335 Instead, as he wound down his Law and the Court address, he
offered his audience a hopeful philosophical picture of what the country
could become:
I do not pin my dreams for the future to my country or even to my race. I
think it probable that civilization somehow will last as long as I care to look
ahead . . . . I think it not improbable that man, like the grub that prepares a
chamber for the winged thing it never has seen but is to be—that man may
336
have cosmic destinies that he does not understand.

But Holmes would not stop there. As he closed out his thoughts on
the evolution of the country he loved, he offered some spiritual
encouragement to his audience as well. The warrior country that “touched
[him] with fire” as a young man,337 he acknowledged years earlier in The
Soldier’s Faith, had been eclipsed by the interests of commerce.338 Among
every stratum of society “money [had become] the main thing.” 339 “There
are many, poor and rich,” he said with a soft sadness, “who think that love
of country is an old wife’s tale, to be replaced by interest in a labor union,
or . . . by a rootless self-seeking search for a place where the most
enjoyment may be had at the least cost.”340 But no matter what would

334. See, e.g., Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Felix Frankfurter (Mar. 27, 1917), in
HOLMES & FRANKFURTER, supra note 225, at 69, 70 (“Patriotism is the demand of the
territorial club for priority. . . . I go the whole hog for the territorial club and I don’t care a
damn if it interferes with some of the spontaneities of the other groups.”).
335. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Alice Stopford Green (Oct. 1, 1901), in THE
ESSENTIAL HOLMES, supra note 1, at 111, 111.
336. Oliver W. Holmes, Law and the Court, Speech at a Dinner of the Harvard Law
School Association of New York (Feb. 15, 1913), in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS, supra note
30, at 291, 296.
337. Oliver W. Holmes, Memorial Day, Address before John Sedgwick Post No. 4,
Grand Army of the Republic, in Keene, N.H. (May 30, 1884), in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES,
supra note 1, at 80, 86 (“[T]he generation that carried on the war has been set apart by its
experience. Through our great good fortune, in our youth our hearts were touched with
fire.”).
338. Oliver W. Holmes, The Soldier’s Faith, Address to the graduating class of Harvard
University (May 30, 1895), in OCCASIONAL SPEECHES, supra note 31, at 73, 73 (“[W]ar is
out of fashion . . . . The aspirations of the world are those of commerce.”).
339. Id. at 74.
340. Id.
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become of the Empire, Holmes counseled the Harvard group to take solace
in something that is far more valuable and far more enduring—the eternal
flame that burns in the hearts of mankind:
The other day my dream was pictured to my mind. It was evening. I
was walking homeward on Pennsylvania Avenue near the Treasury, and as
I looked beyond Sherman’s Statue to the west the sky was aflame with
scarlet and crimson from the setting sun. But, like the note of downfall in
Wagner’s opera, below the sky line there came from little globes the pallid
discord of the electric lights.
And I thought to myself the
Götterdämmerung will end, and from those globes clustered like evil eggs
will come the new masters of the sky. It is like the time in which we live.
But then I remembered the faith that I partly have expressed, faith in a
universe not measured by our fears, a universe that has thought and more
than thought inside of it, and as I gazed, after the sunset and above the
341
electric lights there shone the stars.

341. Oliver W. Holmes, Law and the Court, Speech at a Dinner of the Harvard Law
School Association of New York (Feb. 15, 1913), in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS, supra note
30, at 291, 297.
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